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WATCHING THE WATCHDOG: CHINA'S STATE
COMPENSATION LAW AS A REMEDY FOR
PROCURATORIAL MISCONDUCT
Keith Handt
Abstract: In 1994, China enacted a comprehensive State Compensation Law
("SCL"). The SCL provides individuals and legal entities with the right to compensation
in a limited number of situations in which they are harmed by illegal government acts.
The purpose of the law is twofold: (1) to guarantee the rights of individuals and legal
entities to obtain compensation and (2) to encourage state officials to exercise their
powers lawfully. In theory, the SCL provides an important check on the conduct of
procurators and other government officials. China's procurators serve dual roles as
criminal prosecutors and as supervisors of the legal process. As supervisors of the legal
process, procurators are largely responsible for policing themselves and preventing
procuratorial misconduct. There are few external controls on procurators, and the
controls that exist are weak and seldom applied in practice. This Comment examines the
issue of whether the SCL will provide an adequate citizen-based check on procuratorial
power. It argues that while the SCL should be considered a positive step towards
promoting greater official accountability and protecting individual rights in China,
limitations on the scope of the law, flaws in the procedures for state compensation, the
limited liability of individual procurators for compensation expenses, and official
resistance to the SCL's implementation severely limit the utility of the law as a remedy
for procuratorial and other official misconduct.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the mid 1990's, the National People's Congress ("NPC") of the
People's Republic of China ("PRC") has made a number of promising
changes to the PRC criminal justice system. The NPC approved
amendments to the PRC Criminal Law' and, in an attempt to professionalize
China's corps of judicial and law enforcement personnel and fight official
corruption, passed legislation governing the standards and duties of judges,
prosecutors, and police.2 The most far-reaching reforms came in March of
I The author would like to thank Professor Jerome A. Cohen, Professor Donald Clarke, and his
father, Bruce G. Hand, for their guidance and suggestions on this Comment. The author would also like to
thank the Council on Foreign Relations for its support of the initial draft of this Comment.
New Criminal Law Enshrines Rule of Law, BEIJING XINHUA DOMESTIC SERVICE, May 14, 1997,
translated in BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION ("BBC") SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar.
17, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File. Among other reforms, the new amendments
established the principle that an act may not be considered a crime unless it is explicitly defined as such in
the Criminal Law. Id.
2 See Zhonghua Rermin Gongheguo Jianchaguanfa [People's Republic of China Procurators Law]
(adopted Feb. 28, 1995) [hereinafter Procurators Law], Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renmin Jingchafa
[People's Republic of China Police Law] (adopted Feb. 28, 1995), Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Faguanfa
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1996, when the NPC approved extensive amendments to the PRC Criminal
Procedure Law ("CPL"). Included in the many changes to this twenty-year
old law were revised provisions that provide defendants with greater access
to defense counsel, create a greater separation of prosecutorial and judicial
functions, and limit the Chinese practice of "verdict first, trial later" by
enhancing the role of trial courts.3 Although elements of PRC criminal
procedure continue to fall short of international standards,4 these legislative
achievements represent positive steps towards promoting the rule of law and
the rights of criminal defendants in Chiha.
China's procuratorates, or prosecutorial organs, play a key role in
enforcing these new procedural protections and professional standards. As
the designated watchdogs of China's legal system, procuratorates are
responsible for addressing violations of criminal statutes and pursuing
complaints of official misconduct. As prosecutors and in some cases
investigators, however, procurators must fulfill a crime-fighting function
that is not always consistent with their duty as supervisors of the legal
process; in their zeal to catch and convict criminals, procurators themselves
sometimes violate the law.' This conflict raises a number of questions. Are
there legal checks on procuratorial power in China? What remedies are
available to Chinese citizens if procurators pursue false charges against them
or violate their recently strengthened procedural rights? Who is watching
the watchdog?
China's 1994 State Compensation Law ("SCL") provides some
answers to these questions. Under the SCL, individuals and legal entities
may obtain compensation in a limited number of situations in which they are
harmed by the illegal acts of state organs or officials.6 In theory, the purpose
of the SCL is twofold: (1) to guarantee the rights of individuals and legal
entities to obtain state compensation and (2) to encourage state organs and
[People's Republic of China Judges Law] (adopted Feb. 28, 1995), translated in THE LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1995 67-112 (1996).
3 LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, OPENING TO REFORM? AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S
REVISED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW (1996); H.L. Fu, Criminal Defense in China: The Possible Impact of
the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law Reform, CHINA Q., Mar. 1998, at 31.
4 LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 61.
5 See infra Part II.
6 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Peichangfa [State Compensation Law of the People's
Republic of China] (adopted May 12, 1994) art. 2 [hereinafter SCL], reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN
GONGHEGUO GUOWUYUAN GONGBAO [GAzETrE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA], June 27, 1994, 430-38. For an English translation of the SCL, see Text of Law on State
Compensation, BEIJING XINHUA DOMESTIC SERVICE, May 12, 1994, translated in FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE CHINA ("FBIS-CHI") 94-096, May 18, 1994, at 33-37. According to Article 33 of
the law, foreign nationals and enterprises within the territory of the PRC can request state compensation.
Id.
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officials to exercise their powers and functions legally.7 This Comment
addresses the issue of whether the SCL and its implementing regulations are
adequate to fulfill this dual purpose and to serve as a citizen-based check on
procuratorial power. Part II of this Comment introduces the problem of
procuratorial misconduct and the need for effective remedies to counter such
misconduct. Part III traces the development of state. compensation in China.
Part IV describes the provisions of the SCL in detail and examines the
application of the SCL to procuratorial misconduct. In this discussion,
problems with the SCL are identified and revisions to the law and its
implementing regulations are suggested. Part V provides an analysis of the
first four years of experience under the SCL. Because the activities of
China's procuratorates fall under the SCL's criminal compensation
provisions, this Comment focuses on the criminal compensation portion of
the law. However, SCL procedures for administrative compensation are
addressed at appropriate points in the discussion to provide a comparative
framework and a basis for possible revisions to the criminal compensation
system.
This Comment argues that while the SCL should be considered a
positive step towards promoting greater official accountability and
protecting individual rights in China, the law's practical utility as a remedy
for procuratorial misconduct and as a mechanism for encouraging proper
procuratorial behavior is limited. The SCL is limited in scope and does not
provide a right to compensation for many violations of criminal procedure
and other potentially harmful conduct by officials. Claimants face numerous
procedural and practical obstacles in applying for compensation, and
procuratorates that violate individual rights are held accountable for
compensation costs in only a small number of situations. Finally, the first
four years of experience under the law indicate that Chinese citizens do not
understand their rights under the SCL and that procurators and other
officials are resisting implementation of the law. In addition, the standard
compensation awards may be too low to make it worthwhile for some
citizens to pursue compensation claims. These problems will need to be
addressed before the SCL will attain its full potential as a legal check on
procuratorial power.
7 Id. art. 1.
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II. THE PROBLEM OF AN UNCHECKED PROCURATORATE
Although the PRC Constitution refers to procuratorates as the state
organs for "legal supervision, '8 procuratorates exercise both prosecutorial
and watchdog functions. In their prosecutorial role, procuratorates review
cases investigated by public security officials, decide whether to approve
arrests and prosecute criminal suspects, and carry out public prosecutions on
behalf of the state.9 As the watchdogs of China's bureaucracy and legal
system, however, procuratorates are also responsible for investigating cases
involving official graft and dereliction of duty; supervising criminal
investigations, trials, and the execution of sentences; and investigating
citizen complaints against state personnel.'0 These supervisory powers
include the right to appeal verdicts if a procuratorate determines that a
criminal or civil court has made errors." Article 8 of China's CPL confirms
the role of procuratorates as supervisors of the criminal process. 2
Despite the watchdog role of the procuratorates, corruption and
abuses by procurators are widespread. PRC Procurator General Han Zhubin
recently admitted that corruption, favoritism, and torture by procurators are
"rampant" in some areas of the country." Lawlessness in the criminaljustice system has even prompted Li Peng, the hard-line chairman of the
NPC, to propose reforms such as open trials and more active supervision of
law enforcers by local people's congresses." Although China's chief
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa [Constitution of the People's Republic of China] (adoptedDec. 4, 1982, amended Apr. 12, 1988, Mar. 29, 1993, March 15, 1999) art. 129 [hereinafter PRC
Constitution], reprinted and translated in I CHINA L. FOR FOREIGN Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 4-500 (1997).
' Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jianchayuan Zuzhifa [Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates
of the People's Republic of China] (adopted July 1, 1979, amended Sept. 2, 1983) art. 5 [hereinafterOrganic Law of the People's Procuratorates], translated in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
1983-1986 48-54 (1987).
'o Id. arts. 5-6.
" Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susongfa [Criminal Procedure Law of the People'sRepublic of China] (adopted July 1, 1979, amended Mar. 17, 1996) arts. 169, 181 [hereinafter CPL],
reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GUOWUYUAN GONGBAO [GAZETTE OF THE STATE COUNCIL
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], Apr. 18, 1996, 378-413. For an English translation of the CPL, seePRC: Amended PRC Criminal Procedure Law, BEIJING XINHUA DOMESTIC SERVICE, Mar. 23, 1996,translated in FBIS-CHI 96-069, Apr. 9, 1996. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susongfa [CivilProcedure Law of the People's Republic of China] (adopted Apr. 9, 1991) arts. 184-85, reprinted andtranslated in 4 CHINA L. FOR FOREIGN Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 19-201 (1992) [hereinafter 4 CHINA L. FOR
FOREIGN BUS.].
12 CPL, supra note 11, art. 8.
' Daniel Kwan, Prosecutors to Face Crackdown, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 25, 1998, at 7.
'4 Daniel Kwan, Li Peng Pushes for Juries and Open Trials, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 17,1998, at 7, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Schina File. According to the PRC Constitution, all caseshandled by the people's courts, except those involving special circumstances, are supposed to be open.PRC Constitution, supra note 8, art. 125. China's national legislature is called the National People'sCongress. Id. art. 58. There are local people's congresses at the various administrative levels of the
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procurator has attempted to paint the worst cases of abuse as the work of a
few black sheep,15 other sources indicate that problems in the justice system
are so widespread that "public respect for law enforcement agencies is at an
all-time low."16 In a crackdown on procuratorial and judicial misconduct in
the first eight months of 1998, for example, PRC investigators examined
50,000 cases and discovered that 1454 of them had been mishandled by
procurators.17 As part of the shake-up, 756 procurators were disciplined. 8
These figures, along with public promises by procuratorial officials to
rectify the problem,' 9 indicate that the problem of procuratorial misconduct
is a serious one.
In some cases, the policies of the PRC leadership exacerbate the
problem of procuratorial misconduct. In response to the waves of crime and
official corruption that have swept across China in recent decades, the PRC
government has embarked on a series of yanda, or "strike hard" anti-crime
campaigns.20 Yanda campaigns, typically short in term but characterized by
large-scale arrests and the application of particularly harsh anti-crime
tactics, are perceived by the leadership to be popular with the public.2' In
the frenzy to strike hard at crime and show substantive results, however,
procuratorates and other law enforcement agencies have often neglected
rules of criminal procedure.22
When exercising their prosecutorial powers, procuratorates faces few
meaningful external checks. Formally, people's congresses at each level of
government" supervise procuratorial organs at the corresponding level and
Chinese state. Id. arts. 95-102. Formally, people's congresses at the various levels of government have the
power to supervise procuratorial organs at the corresponding level. See infra note 24 and accompanying
text.
i Kwan, supra note 13.
6 Susan Lawrence, Crooked Cops, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 20, 1998, at 12.
'7 Shake-up of Procuratorial System, CHINA L. FOR Bus., Oct. 1998, at 14.
I Id.
19 PRC to Educate, Rectify Procuratorial Force, BEIJING XINHUA, May 18, 1998, reprinted in FBIs-
CHI 98-198, May 18, 1998; Han Zhubin Urges Procurators to Clean up Problems, BEIJING XINHUA, May
15, 1998, reprinted in FBIS-CHI 98-135, May 15, 1998; China: Supreme People's Procuratorate Work
Report, BEIJING XINHUA, Mar. 23, 1998, reprinted in FBIS-CHI 98-087, Mar. 28, 1998.
" For increasing crime rates, see Michael Dutton, The Basic Character of Crime in Contemporary
China, translation ofZhongguo xianjieduanfanzui wentiyanjiu, CHINA Q., Mar. 1997, at 160. For official
corruption, see Matt Fomey, Rot All over: Corruption Cuts into the Party's Grassroots Support, FAR E.
EcoN. REV., Oct. 2, 1997, at 21.
21 Bruce Gilley, Rough Justice: Executions Surge in Tough Anti-Crime Drive, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
July 4, 1996, at 22-23.
22 Id. at 22. In the wake of the most recent yanda campaign in 1996, international observers and
Chinese legal scholars expressed concerns that pressure on law enforcement officials to get results led to
quick executions, arbitrary arrests, and a general neglect of legal procedure. Id.
23 See supra note 14.
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have the power to appoint and dismiss procurators.24 Citizens may lodge
complaints with a people's congress by means of a formal petition or by
writing a letter of complaint.25 In practice, however, the power of people's
congresses to supervise procuratorial conduct is limited. Although both the
NPC and local people's congresses have been more active in investigating
complaints and inspecting procuratorates and other state organs over the past
several years, 6 real power over the dismissal of procurators still rests with
local Communist Party ("Party") officials, who must approve decisions to
dismiss govemment officials.27 In this political environment, people's
congresses have found it difficult to supervise procuratorates and other state
organs.28 While head procurators, judges, and public security officials
usually serve as deputy Party secretaries, the leaders of people's congresses
are often excluded from Party committees that oversee procuratorates or are
outranked by public security chiefs and procurators.29 These higher-ranking
officials can hinder efforts by the people's congresses to supervise their
organizations.3"
There are some indications that people's congresses may begin to take
a more active role in policing both procuratorates and courts. In response to
the widespread problem of misconduct in law enforcement, China's leaders
are working to expand the supervisory powers of people's congresses.3' In
August 1999, the NPC approved a set of draft regulations that give it and
local people's congresses enhanced powers to supervise the work of
procurators and judges.32 Specifically, the draft regulations give people's
congresses jurisdiction over major misjudged cases and illegal activities byjudges and law enforcement officials and describe the scope, procedures,
" PRC Constitution, supra note 8, arts. 3, 101, 104, 133; Organic Law of the People's
Procuratorates, supra note 9, art. 23; Di Mao, NPC Playing Supervisory Role, CHNA L., Sept. 15, 1995, at
60 25 Written interview with Supreme People's Procuratorate Official (name withheld upon request)(Sept. 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter SPP Official].
26 Di Mao, supra note 24, at 61-62.
27 Susan V. Lawrence, Excising the Cancer, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 20, 1998, at II (quoting He
Zengke, a researcher with a Communist Party Central Committee think-tank that is studying ways to
counter official corruption).
2 Kevin O'Brien, Chinese People's Congresses and Legislative Embeddedness: Understanding
Early Organizational Development, 27 CoMP. PO. STUD. 80, 92, 98 (1994).
29 Id.
30 Id.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
32 National Legislature Urged to Curb Police Corruption, XINHUA, Oct. 28, 1999, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Xinhua File; China Parliament Head Investigates Judicial Supervision,
Enterprises in Sichuan, XINHUA DOMESTIC SERVICE, Oct. 8, 1999, translated in BBC MONITORING ASIA
PAC., Oct. 9, 1999, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
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and methods for such supervision.33 According to Chinese legislators, the
draft regulations are intended to provide a foundation for a "supervision
law" to be enacted at some future date.3
4
At this early stage, however, it is unclear whether these regulations
will provide an effective check on procuratorates. In early comments on the
regulations, NPC Chairman Li Peng stressed that people's congresses are to
carry out their work under the leadership of Party committees. 35  Thus,
procurators and other law enforcement officers on Party committees may
still be able to use their influence to interfere with supervision of their
organizations by people's congresses.36 In addition, reports indicate that the
people's congresses will exercise their supervisory powers only in "major"
cases.37 According to members of the NPC Standing Committee, the
people's congresses should urge judicial organs to re-examine cases in
which people have "strong" complaints and should only re-examine cases
themselves if people have "very strong complaints" and the case is difficult
for judicial organs to deal with. 38 Such language suggests that supervision
by the people's congresses may protect individuals in only a few of the most
egregious cases of procuratorial misconduct and not in the majority of
misconduct cases in which individual rights are abused at the hands of
procurators.
China's judiciary has even less power than the people's congresses to
supervise the country's procuratorates. In fact, the judiciary is subject to
some supervision by procuratorial organs.39 If a procuratorate determines
that a people's court has committed "actual errors in judgments and orders,"
it can call for a re-adjudication of the case according to procedures for
adjudication supervision in the CPL.40 With regard to the judiciary's power
to sanction procurators, the judiciary has limited power to remedy
procurator misconduct in the pretrial phase.4' There are no circumstances
under which trial courts may return cases to procuratorates on the basis of
pretrial irregularities, and appeals courts may remand cases only for one of
33 Parliament Session Debates Supervision over Judicial Corruption, XINHUA DOMESTIC SERVICE,
Aug. 26, 1999, translated in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Sept. 7, 1999, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
3 Id.
'5 China Parliament Head Investigates Judicial Supervision, Enterprises in Sicuhan, supra note 32.
36 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
37 National Legislature Urged to Curb Police Corruption, supra note 32.
38 Parliament Session Debates Supervision over Judicial Corruption, supra note 33.
31 Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates, supra note 9, art. 5(4); CPL, supra note 11, art. 169.
' CPL, supra note 11, arts. 203-07; Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates, supra note 9, art.
5(4).
41 LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 72-73.
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an enumerated list of procedural violations in the trial phase.42 While trial
courts may in theory exclude illegally obtained evidence, nothing in the CPL
requires the exclusion of such evidence and the prerogative is rarely
exercised.43
Outside of limited supervision by the people's congresses and thejudiciary, China's procuratorates are responsible for policing themselves.
Several legal mechanisms exist through which procuratorates carry out
internal controls. Under the 1995 Procurators Law, procuratorates may mete
out a variety of administrative punishments, from warnings to reductions in
pay and dismissals, to procurators who violate the law." A recent circular
on procuratorial misjudgments issued by the Supreme People's
Procuratorate, China's highest procuratorial body,45 has further strengthened
this framework.46 The circular establishes guidelines and mandates for the
investigation of procurators who misjudge cases or violate procedural
rules.47 The circular is part of a larger effort to crack down on abuses by
criminal justice officials. This effort has resulted in the investigation and
disciplining of some procurators and judges,4" but relies heavily on self-
policing.4 9
Although recent internal efforts to combat procuratorial abuses are
encouraging, self-policing by procuratorates is not an adequate check on
misconduct. Studies on administrative review in China indicate that
individuals rarely succeed in redressing grievances through such channels.5"
While individuals do have the right to lodge complaints in cases of
procuratorial misconduct, procuratorates are the organs that investigate such
42 Id.
11 HE JIANHONG & JOHN R. WALTZ, CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 268 (1995). The CPL states, "[tihe use of
torture to coerce statements and the gathering of evidence by threat, enticement, deceit, or other unlawful
methods are strictly prohibited." CPL, supra note 11, art. 43. No provision of the CPL mandates the
exclusion of such evidence, however.
4 Procurators Law, supra note 2, arts. 33-36.
" The Supreme People's Procuratorate is China's highest procuratorial organ and directs the work of
procuratorates at lower levels. Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates, supra note 9, arts. 2, 10.
' See Renmin Jianchayuan Cuoan Zeren Zhuijiu Tiaoli (Shixing) [Regulations on Accountability of
Misjudgments by People's Procuratorates (Trial Implementation)] (issued July 17, 1998), reprinted in China
Infobank, China Laws and Regulations File (visited Aug. 17, 1999) <http://www.chinainfobank.com>
[hereinafter China Infobank].
47 Id.
41 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
" Shake-up of Procuratorial System, supra note 17. The vice-president of the Supreme People's
Court has noted that the new system relies heavily on self-policing. Id.
3" Minxin Pei, Citizens v. Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China, CHINA Q., Dec. 1997, at
833-34 (citing Liu Jinghuai, Min Gao Guan You Fa Keyi [The Legal Basis for Private Citizens to Sue
Government Officials], LIAOWANG [OUTLOOK], Oct. 29, 1990, at 14).
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complaints,5 and no legal mechanism exists through which citizens can
compel a procuratorate to carry out its duty to supervise the criminal
process.52 Other possible mechanisms for exposing abuses and creating
pressure for investigations, such as an independent press, do not presently
exist in China.53 Finally, while the people's congresses may begin to play a
more active role in the supervision of procuratorial work,54 their new
supervisory powers are untested, and it may be difficult from a practical
standpoint for people's congresses to deal with every case of procuratorial
misconduct in China.
Given the structure of internal controls, rectification of procuratorial
misconduct depends almost entirely upon the will of the procuratorate itself.
When procuratorates place a higher priority on fighting crime than on
observing rights, as they have in the yanda campaigns, or are unwilling to
take action against one of their own officials, most of the mechanisms for
addressing procuratorial misconduct are inadequate. This raises the specter
of a procuratorate able to exercise its prosecutorial and investigative
authority in an arbitrary, uncontrolled fashion without fear of reprisal by
other branches of the government. It also highlights the importance of a
recent law that provides citizens with an alternative remedy for procuratorial
misconduct-the State Compensation Law.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S STATE COMPENSATION SYSTEM
The State Compensation Law was adopted by the Standing
Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress in May of 1994."5 The
law was intended to guarantee victims of illegal government acts the right to
state compensation and to encourage procurators and other officials to carry
" LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 73-74. The Supreme People's
Procuratorate and provincial-level procuratorates are reported to have established hotlines for direct
complaints. China: Procurator General Hears Complaints on Procurator Day, BEWItNG XNHUA, reprinted
in FBIS-CHI 98-148, May 28, 1998. In July 1998, calls to only one of the three numbers were answered by
a person. The other lines were not operational or were answered by a recording. While the establishment
of these hotlines should be seen as a positive development, they are useful only to the extent that the
procuratorate follows up on the complaints.
52 LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 74.
53 Lawrence, supra note 27. There is some evidence that China's govemment-controlled press is
taking a more active role in exposing abuses by law enforcement officials. Concerned about the wide scale
of misconduct and the resentment it engenders in the populace, the central government has recently begun
to permit, and in some cases has encouraged, press coverage of misconduct cases. See Elisabeth Rosenthal,
Police Abuses Start to Get Attention in China, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1999, at Al.
See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
5CL, supra note 6.
FEBRUARY 2000
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
out their duties lawfully.56 Although previous legislation in China provided
a right to compensation for some improper state acts, the SCL was the first
PRC statute to establish a comprehensive and detailed system for state
compensation. When the SCL was passed, it was trumpeted as a significant
step towards curtailing official abuse and protecting human rights in
China.57 In the context of the present discussion, the SCL is an important
piece of legislation because it establishes a clearly defined right to
compensation and a specific process through which individuals can
challenge procuratorial misconduct. It also provides a mechanism through
which individuals can compel a review of procuratorial acts by a state organ
other than the procuratorate.
A. International Trends in State Compensation
China's enactment of the SCL corresponds with a general
international trend towards the expansion of governmental and official
liability. Over the past century, many countries have recognized the need
for a legal framework that provides compensation for injuries caused by
governmental acts and encourages proper conduct on the part of
governmental actors.5" Although a detailed discussion of these complex and
varied legal frameworks is beyond the scope of this Comment, several
general trends in the area of governmental liability should be noted. At
various points over the last century, most legal systems limited or
abandoned the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity under which a state
was held to be immune from suits in its own courts.59 The departure from
the sovereign immunity doctrine led to the development of new concepts of
56 Id. art. 1.
" Citizens Compensation Law Becomes Effective 1st January, XINHUA DOMESTIC SERVICE, Dec. 20,
1994, translated in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Dec. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allnws File; Chang Wai-Fong, Compensation Law to Fight Corruption, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Dec. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Schina File (quoting Hu Kangsheng, vice-chairman of
the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress).
S There are several excellent comparative studies of governmental liability systems. For a
discussion of Western governmental liability systems, see GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY (John Bell & Anthony W. Bradley eds., 199 1). For a discussion of Asian governmental liability
systems, see COMPARATIVE STUDIES ON GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA (Yong
Zhang ed., 1999) [hereinafter GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY IN ASIA).
" Anthony W. Bradley & John Bell, Governmental Liability: A Preliminary Assessment, in
GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 58, at 1, 5. Bell and Bradley note that
while the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity has been abandoned in most countries, it still influences
the parameters of official liability in some places, particularly common law countries such as the United
States and Canada. Id. See also Yong Zhang, Commentaries-Comparative Studies on the Development of
Governmental Liability in East and Southeast Asia, in GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY IN ASIA, supra note 58,
at 201, 201-05.
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general state liability for injuries caused by official acts.6" In addition,
immunities from lawsuits that some officials have long enjoyed have also
been narrowed in many countries.6 In general, the liability of both the state
and individual government officials is expanding.62
In enacting a comprehensive national law on state compensation,
China followed in the footsteps of other East Asian countries. Since World
War II, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have all passed state compensation
acts.63 Although the state compensation systems in these three countries
differ in many respects, several basic features are common to all of them.
First, under each of the compensation statutes, the state must provide
compensation when public officials, in the course of performing their
official duties, intentionally or negligently commit unlawful acts that cause
injury to individuals.' None of the statutes specifies or limits the unlawful
acts for which compensation may be given. Second, the government has a
right to demand reimbursement of compensation expenses from individual
officials whose intentional or grossly negligent acts cause damage and result
in compensation claims.6 5 Finally, all three countries have enacted statutes
that deal specifically with compensation for wrongful detentions or arrests.66
66 Toshiro Fuke, Historical Phases of State Liability As Law of Remedies-Some Introductory
Remarks, in GOVERNMENT LIABILITY IN ASIA, supra note 58, at 1, 1-2. There are numerous examples of
these developments. In 1947, England passed the Crown Proceedings Act, under which the central
government became liable for injuries under the general rules of tort law. John Bell, The Law of England
and Wales, in GOVERNMENT LIABILITY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 58, at 17, 18. In the
United States, the Federal Tort Claims Act, passed in 1946, gives federal courts broad jurisdiction to hear
tort claims against the United States. Ronald A. Cass, Official Liability in America: Actors and Incentives,
in GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 58, at 110, 118. Since before
World War I, the German state has been liable for the wrongful acts of public officials. In 1981, Germany
enacted a comprehensive state liability act that was later found to be unconstitutional. Wolfgang Rufner,
Basic Elements of German Law on State Liability, in GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 58, at 249, 252-53, 272-73. For the development of state compensation laws in
East Asia, see infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
61 See generally GOVERNMENT LIABILITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 58.
62 Id.
63 See Kokka Baisho Ho [Law Concerning State Liability for Compensation] (passed Oct. 27, 1947)
Law No. 125 [hereinafter State Compensation Law of Japan], translated in I EHS LAW BULL. SERIES AL
(1991); Gukka Bae Sang Bop [State Redress Act] (passed Mar. 3, 1967, amended Feb. 5, 1973) Law No.
1899 [hereinafter State Redress Act of Korea], translated in LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 293-96 (3d
ed. 1975); Guojia Peichangfa [State Compensation Law] (passed July 2, 1980) [hereinafter State
Compensation Law of Taiwan], reprinted and translated in MAJOR LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON
TAIWAN 1414-18 (1991).
' State Compensation Law of Japan, supra note 63, art. 1; State Redress Act of Korea, supra note
63, art. 2(1); State Compensation Law of Taiwan, supra note 63, art. 2.
61 State Compensation Law of Japan, supra note 63, art. 1(2); State Redress Act of Korea, supra note
63, art. 2(2); State Compensation Law of Taiwan, supra note 63, art. 2.
' Keiji Hosho Ho [Criminal Indemnity Law] (passed Jan. 1, 1950, multiple amendments) Law No. 1
[hereinafter Criminal Indemnity Law of Japan], translated in 2 EHS LAW BULL. SERIES SA (1991);
Hyungsa Bo Sang Bop [Penal Compensation Act] (passed Aug. 13, 1958, multiple amendments) Law No.
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Despite the passage of such "criminal compensation" statutes, each
country's general state compensation act still applies to the acts of judges
and prosecutors (although in some cases the general compensation statutes
may not apply to judicial officials in the same way that they apply to other
officials).67 Chinese scholars indicate that the drafters of the SCL borrowed
provisions from the state compensation laws of other countries.68 China's
SCL thus shares a number of characteristics with these statutes.6 9
B. The Legal Foundations and Development of State Compensation in
China
The SCL is not the first or only legal document in the PRC to deal
with state compensation. The legal basis for state compensation is found in
the PRC Constitution, which guarantees compensation to citizens who have
"suffered losses as a result of the infringement of their civic rights by any
state organ or functionary."70 In China, such constitutional rights cannot be
directly invoked by citizens or enforced by a people's court without specific
494 [hereinafter Penal Compensation Act of Korea], translated in 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA 871-78 (1992); Yuanyu Peichangfa [Law of Compensation for Unjust Detention and Conviction]
(effective Sept. 1, 1959, multiple amendments) [hereinafter Criminal Compensation Law of Taiwan],
reprinted in ZuIxN LIUFA QUANSHU 1121-22 (1995).
67 The provisions of the State Compensation Law of Taiwan apply to judges and prosecutors when
these officials are found to have committed a criminal offense while conducting a trial or prosecution. State
Compensation Law of Taiwan, supra note 63, art. 13. The Supreme Court of Japan has held that judicial
acts fall within the scope of its state compensation law, but only if "judicial authority has been exercised
undoubtedly contrary to the aims of vested authority, such as a judgment being made with an illegal or
unlawful purpose." K. Kamino, Governmental Compensations [sic] in Japan, in GOVERNMENT LIABILITY
IN ASIA, supra note 58, at 95, 100 (quoting the Japanese Supreme Court's decision of March 2, 1982 (36
Minsyuu No. 3 (1982), at 329)). The State Redress Act of Korea also applies to judicial acts, but
compensation liability for such acts is more difficult to establish than for other official acts. Won Woo Suh,
Governmental Liability in Korea, in GOVERNMENT LIABILITY IN ASIA, supra note 58, at 9, 15.
6' GUOJIA PEICHANGFA SHILUN [EXPLANATION OF THE STATE COMPENSATION LAW] 63 (Pi Chunxie et
al. eds., 1994).
69 See infra Part Iv.A.
0 PRC Constitution, supra note 8, art. 41. China's first constitution, which was adopted in 1954,
also contained a compensation provision. Article 97 of the 1954 PRC Constitution provided, "If the rights
of the citizen have been violated by civil servants, and the violation has caused damage, the citizen has a
right to seek damages." Yong Zhang, Governmental Liability in China, in GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY IN
ASIA, supra note 58, at 49, 51. This provision was ignored in practice. Id. at 52. Provisions for state
compensation were deleted from the 1975 and 1978 PRC Constitutions for ideological reasons. The
provisions were seen as unnecessary because, in theory, government organs were made up of the people
and the wealth of China belonged to the people. Thus, according to Yong Zhang, there was "neither a
political nor an ideological conflict of interest between the government and the people." Id. State
compensation was reinstated in the 1982 PRC Constitution as part of China's legal reform effort. Id. at 52-
53.
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laws and regulations to implement them.7 Prior to the passage of the State
Compensation Law in 1994, a number of such laws existed. The 1981
Economic Contract Law and 1987 Customs Law, for example, contained
narrow provisions related to state compensation.7 2  More significantly, the
1986 General Principles of the Civil Law ("GPCL") provided a general
statutory basis for liability on the part of state organs. According to Article
121 of the GPCL, "if a state agency or its work personnel, while executing
its duties, violates the lawful rights and interests of a citizen or legal person,
thereby causing damage, it shall bear civil responsibility."73  In practice,
however, Article 121 was too brief and general to deal with the variety of
complex legal issues related to state compensation, and more detailed
legislation was deemed necessary.74 Because the SCL is a more recent
statute dealing with the same subject as Article 121 of the GPCL and is more
detailed than Article 121, state compensation claimants may no longer bring
claims under the GPCL.75
In 1989, the NPC passed the PRC Administrative Litigation Law
("ALL").76 The passage of the ALL constituted China's first step towards
establishing a comprehensive legal framework for state compensation. The
ALL provides detailed procedures through which Chinese citizens, legal
entities, and organizations may challenge a range of administrative acts.77
Among the acts covered by the law are administrative penalties such as
detentions, fines, cancellations of permits or licenses, and property
7' Lin Feng, Chinese Law: An Examination of the State Compensation Law 1994, 25 HONG KONG
L.J. 401, 402 (1995); see also X. Liu, The Administrative Compensation System in China, in
GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY IN ASIA, supra note 58, at 81, 81.
' Lin Feng, supra note 71; Jiang Bixin, Of China's Present State Compensation System, CHINA L.,
Mar. 15, 1995, at 81.
"' Zhonghua Rennmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze [General Principles of the Civil Law of the
People's Republic of China] (adopted Apr. 12, 1986) art. 121 [hereinafter GPCL], reprinted and translated
in 4 CHINA L. FOR FOREIGN Bus., supra note 11, 19-150 (1987).
7' Lin Feng, supra note 71, at 403.
75 LIN FENG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES 278 (1996). It is unclear whether
only those claimants with a right to compensation under the SCL are barred from bringing an Article 121
claim or whether the SCL is now the sole legal basis for bringing a claim for injuries caused by state
organs exercising their powers and functions. Prior to the passage of the SCL, Chinese citizens could sue
for damages when a state official, while carrying out his or her duties, caused damage intentionally or as a
result of negligence. Yong Zhang, supra note 70, at 72. However, the SCL clearly establishes illegality,
and excludes liability and fault, as the basis for state liability. Id. The SCL also lists the specific acts for
which compensation liability may arise. Thus, in theory, the state is not liable for compensation in other
cases. Id. This leaves many victims of illegal official acts not listed in the law, as well as victims of lawful
but negligent acts, without a legal remedy.
76 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa [Administrative Litigation Law of the
People's Republic of China] (adopted Apr. 4, 1989) [hereinafter ALL], reprinted and translated in 4
CHINA L. FOR FOREIGN BUS., supra note 11, 19-558 (1989).
77 Ying Songnian, China 's Administrative Procedure System, CHINA L., June 15, 1995, at 81.
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confiscation; coercive administrative measures such as the restriction of
personal freedom or the seizure of property; and infringement by
administrative authorities on other personal or property rights.7" Under the
ALL, courts may revoke improper administrative acts, require new
administrative action, and modify administrative penalties if they are clearly
unjust.79 Courts may also award compensation for damages resulting from
unlawful or improper administrative acts."° The compensation provisions in
the ALL emphasize the right of individuals, legal entities, and other
organizations to seek compensation.8 ' The ALL compensation provisions
are also more specific than those of Article 121 of the GPCL. However, the
ALL does not give a right to compensation for some illegal administrative
acts and does not provide a method for calculating the amount of
compensation or a mechanism for the payment of compensation.
2
Following on the heels of the ALL, the State Compensation Law
represents the most recent and most significant step in the establishment of a
comprehensive system of state compensation in the PRC. Administrative
law scholar Lin Feng argues that the drafting of the SCL was initiated to
"secure the implementation of the ALL soon after its adoption. ' '83 There are
several reasons for viewing the SCL as a complement to or extension of the
ALL. The SCL addresses administrative compensation in more detail than
the ALL,84 drops the ALL's requirement that compensation be provided only
for "concrete administrative acts,"8 5 and expands the range of illegal state
acts for which compensation liability may arise. In addition, it is clear that
Chinese lawmakers intended the SCL to be applied in conjunction with the
ALL because the SCL stipulates that claimants may file their claims for
administrative compensation as part of an administrative lawsuit.8 6
7 ALL, supra note 76, art. 11.
7 Id. art. 54.
I d. arts. 67-68. A compensation claim under the ALL must first be brought to the responsible
administrative organ, but later may be filed as a suit in a people's court if the claimant is not satisfied with
the administrative decision. Id.
"I Pitman B. Potter, The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC, in DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN
POST-MAO CHINA 270, 281 (Pitman B. Potter ed., 1994).
2 X. Liu, supra note 71, at 82. For example, the ALL does not apply when the illegal use of police
weapons or gear causes injury or death. Lin Feng, supra note 71, at 411.
8' LIN FENG, supra note 75, at 271.
4 The SCL provides specific procedures for administering state compensation as well as guidelines
for calculating state compensation amounts. SCL, supra note 6, arts. 9-14, 25-29.
8 Id. arts. 3-4. The term "concrete administrative acts" is not defined in the ALL but has been
interpreted to exclude numerous administrative acts from the scope of the ALL. Minxin Pei, supra note 50,
at 835. One Chinese administrative law scholar concedes that nobody can precisely define the concept.
Interview with Wang Xixin, Professor of Administrative and Constitutional Law at Beijing University, in
Seattle, Washington (Mar. 10, 1999) [hereinafter Wang Interview].
86 SCL, supra note 6, art. 9.
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Lin Feng's characterization of the SCL must be qualified in several
respects, however. First, as Lin indicates, the scope of the SCL is narrower
than the ALL in that it covers only illegal state acts, while the ALL covers
both illegal and wrongful administrative acts.87 Second, and more
importantly, the SCL establishes a right to compensation in an entirely new
class of cases involving criminal justice organs.88 The SCL contains
different provisions for "administrative" and "criminal" compensation cases.
A compensation case is classified as criminal if investigative, procuratorial,
judicial, or prison management organs or officials, while exercising their
functions and powers, infringe upon the personal or property rights of an
individual or a legal entity.89 The term "criminal compensation" in this
sense does not refer to any criminal act on the part of the official (although a
criminal compensation case may involve such an act) but instead refers to
compensation liability that arises in the course of a criminal investigation
and prosecution. Criminal compensation is handled through a separate,
nonjudicial procedure.9" Thus, criminal compensation claims may not be
filed as part of an administrative lawsuit. With the exception of public
security organs, which both investigate criminal cases (a judicial
administration function) and carry out administrative punishments, the state
organs subject to the SCL's criminal compensation provisions cannot be
sued under the ALL, and consequently are not subject to the ALL's
provisions on compensation.9  The SCL thus provides for new
compensation liability on the part of public security, procuratorial, judicial,
and prison management organs that arises when these organs perform
judicial administration functions, a significant development that is obscured
if the SCL is viewed only as an extension of the ALL.
The issues of whether to include criminal compensation in the SCL
and what specific procedure for criminal compensation should be used were
'7 Lin Feng, supra note 71, at 411.
ss SCL, supra note 6, ch. III.
I' ld. arts. 15-16.
91 Id. arts. 20-22.
" According to Professor Wang Xixin, the procuratorate is not considered an administrative organ
and thus is not subject to the ALL. Wang Interview, supra note 85. This is confirmed by Pei's study,
which does not include procuratorial, judicial, or prison management organs in its list of government
agencies that have been sued under the ALL. Minxin Pei, supra note 50, at 839-40. The presence of public
security organs in the category of defendants under the ALL may be explained by the fact that public
security organs investigate crimes and also have the power to mete out administrative punishments in
certain types of cases. It is also confirmed in the SCL, which distinguishes administrative acts from acts
related to procuratorial, judicial, and prison management functions and sets different compensation
standards and procedures for each category. SCL, supra note 6, arts. 3, 15.
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hotly debated during the drafting process. 92 Such debate is not surprising
considering the political climate in which the SCL was passed. Fears of
rising crime and efforts to "strike hard" at criminals strongly influence
discourse on issues related to criminal justice in the PRC.93 Since criminal
compensation has the potential to make law enforcement personnel less
aggressive for fear of incurring liability, it was probably viewed as an
impediment to crime-fighting efforts.94  Differences in the scope and
procedures for criminal and administrative compensation appear to make it
more difficult for claimants to receive criminal compensation and less likely
that individual criminal justice officials will be punished for misconduct.9"
Thus, the debates over criminal compensation may have resulted in
compromises that weakened the SCL's criminal compensation provisions.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATE COMPENSATION LAW AND THEIR
APPLICATION TO PROCURATORIAL MISCONDUCT
A. The Scope of State Compensation
The scope of the SCL is defined in three distinct sections of the law.
Section 1 outlines the general requirements for compensation liability.96
Section 2 describes the scope of administrative compensation. 97 Because the
administrative compensation provisions do not apply to procuratorates, they
are not addressed here. Section 3 defines the scope of criminal
compensation and discusses how it applies to procuratorates.9t The
provisions defining the scope of the SCL suffer from a number of
deficiencies. First, ambiguities in some of these provisions have led to
confusion and debate regarding the types of misconduct that the law applies
92 Gu Angran, Guojia Peichangfa Zhiding Qingkuang he Zhuyao Wenti (The Establishment and Key
Issues of the State Compensation Law], ZHONGGUO FAXOE [CHINESE LEGAL SCI.], no. 2, 1995, at 18; Lin
Feng, supra note 71, at 413 (citing Zhu Weijiu, Comment on the State Compensation Law of the People's
Republic of China, ZHONGGUO LOSHI [CHINA L.], 1994, at 29).
93 LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 5-6.
" There is some evidence that these concerns were discussed in the drafting process. Lin Feng
contends that the compensation liability of individual administrative officials was limited to cases of
intentional and grossly negligent misconduct so that they would not become overcautious. This argument
was probably made in the criminal compensation context as well. See Lin Feng, supra note 71, at 413
(citing ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GUOJIA PEICHANGFA SHIYI [INTERPRETATION OF THE STATE
COMPENSATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 36 (Hu Kangsheng ed., 1994)).
9s See infra Part IV.
9 SCL, supra note 6, ch. I.
Id. ch. II.
Id. ch. III.
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to. Second, restrictions on the scope of the SCL limit its effectiveness as a
remedy for many types of procuratorial misconduct.
1. The General Scope of State Compensation
The general scope of the SCL is set out in Article 2, which states that
a right to compensation under the SCL exists when state organs or personnel
harm citizens, legal persons, or other entities through the illegal exercise of
their functions and powers.99 This provision places four limitations on the
scope of state compensation. First, the infringing entity must be a state
organ or an employee of a state organ.'I° Thus, the acts of Communist Party
organs and personnel are beyond the scope of the law.l'c Second, the act or
omission that gives rise to a compensation claim must relate to the state
functions and powers of the organ or official in question.10 2 As a corollary,
in order for a compensation right to exist, some special relationship must
exist between a state organ and a claimant under the SCL, such as the
relationship between a procuratorate and a criminal defendant.'0 3 Third, the
illegality (weifaxing) of the act, and not fault or intention, is the basis for
compensation liability under the SCL (although as discussed infra, the
determination of whether individual officials must reimburse the state for
compensation expenses is based on fault).'1 ' Finally, the illegal act must be
the cause of an injury to the claimant and the injury must be proven." 5
The ambiguity of several of the requirements for state compensation
has generated debate among Chinese scholars over the scope of the SCL.
For example, there are varying opinions on when an act relates to an official
9' Id. art. 2.
"' DING YUECHAO ET AL., GuoJIA PEICHANGFA YUANLI YU SHIWU [STATE COMPENSATION LAW
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE] 72 (1998). Although the acts of Communist Party organs and officials are not
explicitly excluded by the SCL, they do not fall within the scope of the law because the Communist Party is
a political entity and not a state organ. Id.
101 Id.
'02 Id. at 73.
03 ZHONGGUO PEICHANG FALO SHIWU QUANSHU [PRACTICE GUIDE TO CHINA'S LAW OF
COMPENSATION] 94 (Zhu Xuanfeng & Ji Feng eds., 1995) [hereinafter PRACTICE GUIDE TO CHINA'S
COMPENSATION LAW]; Lin Feng, supra note 71, at 406. Lin Feng provides an example to illustrate this
special relationship. A policeman investigating a criminal suspect has the necessary relationship with the
suspect for compensation liability to arise. If the policeman injures a bystander in pursuing the suspect, the
bystander could not bring a claim under the SCL because there is no special relationship between a
policeman and a bystander. Id. at 407.
114 See Lin Feng, supra note 71, at 405.
103 DING YUECHAO ET AL., supra note 100, at 84-86; Lin Feng, The State Compensation Law of the
People's Republic of China, I CHINA L.J., no. 9, 1995, at 17, 18.
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function or duty. 0 6 "Personal" acts committed by state functionaries that do
not relate to their specific functions or powers do not fall within the scope of
the SCL. °7 However, some scholars argue that when an official commits a
"personal" act while taking on the appearance of performing his or her
official functions, compensation liability may arise. 0 8  In this view, a
policeman who causes an accident while driving a police car for personal
use would be liable under the SCL.' °9 Without a clear definition in the SCL,
however, the scope of the law with respect to "official powers and
functions" remains uncertain.
The SCL requirement that an exercise of state power be "illegal" to
fall within the scope of the law has also generated some debate. Illegality is
not defined in the SCL. Some Chinese scholars contend that an act is illegal
under the SCL if it violates any written law or regulation, whether
substantive or procedural, including the PRC Constitution, statutes,
administrative rules and regulations, local rules and regulations, and other
normative documents."0 Other scholars argue that violations of general
principles of law, such as the principles of honesty and trust or the principle
of not abusing official discretion, also constitute illegal acts for the purposes
of the SCL."' Again, because the term "illegal" is not defined, the scope of
the SCL is unclear.
" For a detailed discussion of the varying views on this issue, see Guojia Peichangfa Shishizhong deRuogan Wenti [Several Problems in the Implementation of the State Compensation Law], JINGJI R1BAO[EcON. DAILY],'May 5, 1999, available in China Infobank, supra note 46 [hereinafter SCL Implementation,
Several Problems].
107 DING YUECHAO ET AL., supra note 100, at 77. For example, both a market regulator who exceeds
her legal power in regulating the market and a police officer who tortures a suspect have committed acts
that fall within the scope of the law. Ifa procurator unlawfully tries to regulate business, however, this act
does not fall within the scope of the SCL because it does not bear any relation to the functions or powers of
a procurator. Presumably, citizens and legal entities harmed as the result of the personal act of an official
that was unrelated to the official's powers and functions could bring an action under the General Principles
of the Civil Law. Id.; see also SCL, supra note 6, arts. 5, 17(4).
"0' X. Liu, supra note 71, at 83.
59 Id. One Chinese commentator argues that the following acts fall within the scope of the SCL: (1)
acts related to executing the duties and responsibilities given to state organs and personnel under the PRC
Constitution or a statute, or acts intimately related to the execution of such duties (such as when a
procurator tortures a suspect in the course of an interrogation); (2) abuses of power or functions for some
illegal purpose; (3) failing to act when there is a legal duty to act; and (4) acts which, although outside of
the scope of the duties, obligations, or responsibilities bestowed upon a state organ or official under the law,
would nonetheless be considered by people to be exercises of a state function or power. (For example, ifa
traffic officer detained a driver when the officer only had the power to fine or warn the drivers, the
detention would fall within the scope of the SCL.) SCL Implementation, Several Problems, supra note 106.
"o DING YUECHAO ET AL., supra note 100, at 78-82; Yong Zhang, Governmental Liability in China,
supra note 70, at 57-59.
. DING YUECHAO ET AL., supra note 100, at 78-82; Yong Zhang, Governmental Liability in China,
supra note 70, at 60.
Vol. 9 No. I
CHINA 'S STATE COMPENSATION LAW
In addition to creating ambiguity regarding the scope of state
compensation, the SCL's focus on the illegality of state acts, as opposed to
the subjective fault or intent of state organs or officials, has had the effect of
excluding many types of injury from the scope of the law. Damages
resulting from flaws in public works or public utilities, for example, cannot
be recovered under the SCL because they are not the result of an "illegal"
act. 1 2  Moreover, because of the limited scope of the law, individuals
injured as a result of other lawful but negligent exercises of official power
may be left without a right to compensation at all. For example, if a
policeman lawfully but negligently shoots at a criminal and one of the
bullets hits an innocent bystander, the bystander does not have a claim under
the SCL." 3 Prior to the passage of the SCL, compensation for such injuries
could be recovered under Article 121 of the GPCL." 4 However, the SCL
specifies that the state is liable for damages only for illegal exercises of state
power." '5 Thus, in theory, damages for injuries resulting from lawful
exercises of state power can no longer be recovered under the GPCL
provision.16 Victims with such harms are thus left without a legal right to
compensation and can only hope to receive discretionary "policy
reparations" from the state to compensate them for their damages." 7
2. The Scope of Criminal Compensation
The specific circumstances under which criminal compensation may
be obtained are listed in Articles 15 and 16 of the SCL. Under these
provisions, victims are entitled to criminal compensation if procuratorial,
judicial, investigative, or prison management organs or officials, in the
exercise of their functions and powers, infringe upon personal or property
rights in the following ways:
15(1) Wrongfully (cuowu) detaining people in the absence of corpora
delicti [the body of facts that constitute an offense] or people who are not
proven by fact to be suspects of major crimes;
15(2) Wrongfully arresting people in the absence of corpora delicti;
..2 Yong Zhang, supra note 70, at 63, 66 (citing an official explanation of a draft of the State
Compensation Law). Damages resulting from flaws in public works can be recovered under Articles 125
and 126 of the GPCL. Id.
.. Id. at 71.
"4 Id. at 72.
115 Id.
116 Id.
"' Id. at 66-7 1; see also supra note 75 and accompanying text.
FEBRUARY 2000
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
15(3) Enforcing the original penalty before the ruling is changed to
not guilty during retrials held in accordance with procedures for supervising
judicial administration;
15(4) Using torture to coerce statements, inflicting physical injuries
on or causing the deaths of citizens through violent acts such as physical
assault, or instigating other people to cause physical injuries or death
through similar acts;
15(5) Inflicting physical injuries on or causing the death of citizens
through the illegal use of weapons or police gear;
16(1) Illegally (weifa) instituting such measures as confiscating,
seizing, freezing, and retrieving property; or
16(2) Collecting fines or confiscating property as originally sentenced
before the verdict is changed to not guilty during retrials held in accordance
with procedures for supervising judicial administration.118
Although the SCL provisions on criminal compensation appear to be
broad in scope, language in the statute and interpretations of the law reveal a
number of limitations. First, guilty individuals do not have a right to
criminal compensation in many of the circumstances listed in Articles 15
and 16. For example, unless found innocent of a crime, individuals are not
eligible to be compensated for violations of personal freedom that stem from
detention or arrest (iiya).11 9 This limitation is derived from language in
Articles 15(1) and 15(2), which requires arrests and detentions to be
"wrongful" and "in the absence of criminal facts" for compensation liability
to arise. Thus, an individual initially detained in the absence of evidence
that he or she committed a crime but later found guilty of a crime could not
be compensated. 20 Guilty individuals who serve longer terms than the law
provides for their crime, or who are held in prison beyond their sentence, are
also ineligible.' 2 1 This limitation applies to some illegal property seizures as
... SCL, supra note 6, arts. 15-16.
"' See MA HUAIDE, GuOnIA PEICHANGFA DE LILUN YU SHIWU [THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE STATECOMPENSATION LAW] 211 (1994); DING YUECHAO ET AL., supra note 100, at 188-90; LAWYERS COMM.
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 76; XIAO XUN, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO GUOJIA
PEICHANGFA DE LILUN YU SHIYONG ZHINAN [GUIDE TO THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CHINA'S STATE
COMPENSATION LAW] 161-80 (1994). Xiao gives three reasons for denying compensation rights to theguilty in these circumstances. First, compensation in such cases would damage the enthusiasm of law
enforcement authorities in the midst of the wave of criminal activity that has accompanied economic reformin China. Second, in many cases, criminals have damaged state property or interests and should shoulder
the burden of compensating the state. Finally, giving convicted criminals compensation would make them
arrogant, damage the spirit of their victims, and harm public opinion of the government. Id.20 DING YUECHAO ETAL., supra note 100, at 194.
1' LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 76. But see MA HUAIDE, supra note 119,
at 216-17. Ma Huaide argues that compensation should be given for the illegal extension of criminal
sentences or sentences that are harsher than those legally prescribed for the crime in question. Id.
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well. 122  Although Article 16(1) does not contain the same language as
Articles 15(1) and 15(2), procuratorial officials contend that guilty
individuals may not be compensated for improper seizures of their
property. 2 3 In contrast, in cases of injuries or death caused by torture or the
illegal use of police weapons, the right to compensation does not depend on
the guilt or innocence of the'victim. 24 Such acts are deemed violations of
the right to-life and health and are viewed as legitimate harms regardless of
the victim's criminal status.1
25
A second limitation is that violations of criminal procedure are
unlikely to be compensated even though such violations are considered
"illegal acts" that fall within the general scope of the SCL. This is partly
because compensation for "wrongful" detentions, "wrongful" arrests, and
most illegal property seizures is contingent on the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.'26 Thus, when a defendant is arrested without a warrant but
found guilty of a crime, the defendant does not have a right to compensation
for the procedural violation. Similarly, when a defendant's property is
seized without a warrant but the evidence seized proves to be related to a
crime for which the defendant is later found guilty, the improper seizure is
not grounds for compensation.'27
Another reason violations of procedure are unlikely to be
compensated is that the short list of circumstances in which criminal
compensation can be claimed does not include most procedural violations.
This is significant because the SCL is a law of limited scope, and state
compensation is only available in the circumstances specifically described in
the law. 2 8 Thus, many violations of criminal procedure do not give rise to
compensation liability because they do not fit within any of the listed
categories of compensable rights violations. Failing to notify family
members of a detention or refusing to permit criminal suspects to meet with
defense counsel are two examples of procedural violations that are not
2 SPP Official, supra note 25.
I23 d. This view, expressed by a Supreme People's Procuratorate official, is not universal. At least
one Chinese scholar argues that if the property seized is not related to a crime, the right to compensation is
not contingent on the innocence of the victim. DING YUECHAO ET AL., supra note 100, at 204.
124 SPP Official, supra note 25; XIAO XUN, supra note 119, at 161, 164-65.
125 Id.
26 See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
27 SPP Official, supra note 25.
28 PRACTICE GUIDE TO CHINA'S COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 103, at 94. In this sense, the scope
of China's State Compensation Law is much more limited than that of the Japanese, South Korean, and
Taiwanese state compensation statutes, which only require that official acts be "unlawful" or "illegal" and
do not limit the specific circumstances under which compensation may be obtained. See supra notes 63-67
and accompanying text.
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included in the scope of criminal compensation. 2 9  These violations
seriously hinder the ability of a criminal suspect to mount an effective
defense. However, because these and other violations of procedure are not
mentioned in Articles 15 and 16, the SCL does not provide a remedy for
them.
The SCL's lack of emphasis on procedure suggests that the law
should be viewed primarily as a remedy for misjudgments, wrongful
detentions or charges, and illegal violence by criminal justice officials rather
than as a remedy for procedural violations. The small number of published
criminal compensation cases confirms this conclusion-all of them deal
with either torture or the misjudgment or wrongful detention of a
defendant. 3° The emphasis on substance over procedure is not surprising
given the prevailing Chinese attitude that procedural rules should be
followed when possible but should not stand in the way of fighting crime.131
Chinese scholars and officials generally agree that as long as a crime has
taken place, violations of criminal procedure (other than those involving
physical harm to a defendant) should be rectified through administrative
channels rather than through the state compensation system. 132
Finally, Article 17 of the SCL lists several specific circumstances in
which state organs are not responsible for compensation. These include
cases in which citizens injure themselves intentionally, give false
confessions, or are not responsible for crimes because they are underage or
mentally ill. 133 State compensation is also precluded when defendants are
taken into custody but later released because their offenses are "minor" and
not considered "crimes.' 34 Such releases are permitted under Article 15 of
'2 CPL, supra note 11, arts. 64, 96.
JO For SCL cases, see GUOJIA PEICHANG MINGAN DIANPING [REVIEW OF NOTABLE STATE
COMPENSATION CASES] (Liu Fuhua ed., 1997); Xu Xun, State Compensation-Three Years of Experience
with the Law in China, CHINA L., Mar. 15, 1998, at 60; Li Monan Peichangan [The Compensation Case of
Li Moan] and Pei Hanlong Peichangan [The Compensation Case of Pei Hanlong], available in ZUIGAO
RENMIN JIANCHAYUAN GONGBAO [THE GAZETrE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATE], Nov. 11,
1998, reprinted in China Infobank, supra note 46; Shang Cai Jianchayuan Cuobu Pei Jiu Wan [Wrongful
Arrest by the Shang Cai Procuratorate Results in Compensation of Ninety Thousand], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL
Sys. DAILY], Nov. 8, 1999, at 1.
32 Donald Clarke, Justice and the Legal System in China 15-16 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author). A revised version of this article may be found in CHINA IN THE 1990's 83-93 (Robert
Benewick & Paul Wingrove eds., 1995).
3' SPP Official, supra note 25; EXPLANATION OF THE STATE COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 68, at
200-01; PRACTICE GUIDE TO CHINA'S COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 103, at 117.
' SCL, supra note 6, arts. 17(1)-(2) (citing the PRC Criminal Code arts. 14, 15), 17(5).
'3 Id. art. 17(3) (citing the PRC Criminal Procedure Law art. 11). This is an extension of the rule of
no compensation for the guilty. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 76.
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the CPL.'35 This provision appears to provide a loophole for public security
or procuratorial organs that have improperly detained a suspect. If such
individuals are released under the pretense of Article 15, they cannot claim
compensation for their detention. Under a final, catchall exception, the state
is not responsible for compensation in "other circumstances prescribed by
law."' 3 6  Although there are no laws that specify other exceptions to the
SCL, some Chinese scholars have argued that exemptions from general
tortious liability under the GPCL, such as in cases of force majeure or
emergency, would apply under this provision. 137
3. The SCL As Applied to the Procuratorate
Procuratorates could incur liability under most of the circumstances
enumerated in Articles 15 and 16 of the SCL. Only Articles 15(3) and
16(2), which deal with the improper enforcement of judgments, do not apply
to procuratorates. 38 Thus, procuratorates could be liable for misjudgments,
unlawful detentions, the physical abuse of suspects, and illegal property
seizures. Of particular significance to procuratorates is the SCL provision
on wrongful arrests. Under the SCL, the organ that approves arrests (the
procuratorate) is responsible for compensation if an arrest is made in the
absence of criminal facts. 139 In addition, the procuratorate that approves an
arrest is responsible for paying compensation if a court finds that the
defendant is not guilty of criminal charges. 140 Procuratorates and courts of
first instance are also jointly responsible for compensation if a court of
second instance overturns a guilty verdict. 4 ' Such provisions highlight the
formality of an "arrest" in Chinese criminal procedure. Under the Chinese
' CPL, supra note 11, art. 15(1). When the SCL was promulgated, the Criminal Procedure Law had
not yet been revised. As such, Article 17(3) of the SCL refers to Article 11 of the 1979 CPL. China's
Supreme People's Court has confirmed that Article 17(3) of the SCL now incorporates Article 15 of the
revised CPL. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Zhixing Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Guojia Peichangfa Jige Wenti de Jieshi [Supreme People's Court Interpretation of Several Problems
Regarding Implementation of the State Compensation Law by the People's Courts], reprinted in 1997
ZHONGGUO FALO NIANJIAN [1997 CHINA L. YEARBOOK] 556 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 CHINA L.
YEARBOOK].
36 SCL, supra note 6, art. 17(6).
'3 DING YUECHAO ET AL., supra note 100, at 218.
139 Questions and Answers on Criminal Compensation by the Procuratorial Authority, source
obtained from the Beijing office of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (on file with author). All of
the circumstances in Articles 15 and 16, except 15(3) and 15(4), are listed by procuratorial officials as
circumstances under which the procuratorate could be liable for compensation. Id. See also DING
YUECHAO ET AL., supra note 100, at 220-25.
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system, individuals under investigation for crimes are initially "detained" by
public security organs. Only when sufficient evidence of a crime has been
gathered will a public security organ request formal approval from a
procuratorate to make an arrest. 142 Thus, in theory, the SCL provisions on
wrongful arrest place new pressures on procuratorates to ensure that the
evidence of a crime is sufficient to obtain a conviction before a formal arrest
is made. If the evidence is not sufficient and the arrest is thus "wrongful," a
procuratorate may face liability for state compensation if the defendant is
found innocent.
4. Recommendations Related to the Scope of the SCL
Although the SCL applies to a broad range of state acts, several steps
should be taken to clarify the general scope of the law and to provide a
mechanism for those injured by lawful but negligent government acts to
receive compensation. First, to avoid confusion in its application, the SCL
should clarify which acts are considered "illegal" for the purposes of the law
and when an act relates to official "functions and powers." Chinese scholars
agree that a more precise definition of "illegality" is needed. 43 This need
was also recognized by the government of Liaoning Province, which passed
local implementing regulations in 1996 that specify when an act is illegal for
the purposes of the SCL.' 44 Such a clarification could be provided in local
regulations, in an official interpretation by the courts or the NPC, 45 or in an
amendment to the SCL. Clarification at the national level would have the
advantage of creating a uniform national standard for the application of the
SCL. Given the debate over when an act relates to "official functions and
powers," a clarification of this phrase would also be advisable. Finally, the
NPC should either include negligent acts that cause injury within the SCL's
definition of "illegal"'46 acts or confirm that compensation for such acts can
still be pursued under the GPCL. Otherwise, many victims of lawful but
142 See generally CPL, supra note 11, arts. 50-76.
143 Yong Zhang, supra note 70, at 60.
'44 The Liaoning Province implementing regulations for the SCL define an "illegal" act as a violation
of the constitution, law, administrative regulations, or local laws and regulations. According to the
regulations, such violations include (1) incorrectly applying a law or regulation; (2) violating legal
procedure; (3) exceeding official powers; (4) abusing official powers; and (5) failing to carry out, or
delaying in carrying out, a legal duty. Liaoning Sheng Shishi "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia
Peichangfa" Ruogan Guiding [Liaoning Province, Several Provisions on the Implementation of "The State
Compensation Law of the People's Republic of China"] (effective June 1, 1996) art. 5 [hereinafter Liaoning
Provisions], reprinted in China Infobank, supra note 46.
.'. Yong Zhang supra note 70, at 60.
'4 Id. at 78.
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negligent government acts could be left without any compensation if the
government fails to provide compensation voluntarily.
PRC legislators should also consider amending the provisions
defining the scope of criminal compensation. First, violations of procedure
need to be covered more adequately. Procedural protections are worth little
if they cannot be enforced effectively. Presently, there are no effective
mechanisms through which complaints related to procedural rights can be
pursued outside of procuratorial review.'47 Chinese legislators should thus
consider providing a specific right to compensation in cases involving
procedural violations. At a minimum, such a right should be available to
victims who are innocent of a crime or, if the procedural violation is one that
hinders the ability of a suspect to mount an adequate legal defense (such as
the denial of access to legal counsel), to any defendant. Second, the SCL
should confirm that the right of a defendant to compensation is not
automatically precluded if the suspect is released pursuant to Article 15 of
the CPL. Some inquiry into the circumstances of the release should be
permitted in order to ensure that criminal justice organs do not manipulate
this exception to avoid compensation liability for wrongful detentions.
B. State Compensation Standards, Funding, and Liability Allocation
1. Standards for Calculating State Compensation
The various standards for calculating compensation are specified in
Articles 25 through 29 of the SCL. Calculation methods differ according to
the type of harm in question. For violations of the right to personal freedom,
an indemnity is paid for each day of wrongful detention. The daily
indemnity corresponds to the average daily wage set by the state for staff
and workers for the previous year 4 ' and is thus uniform throughout China.
Under Article 30, state organs responsible for wrongful detentions, arrests,
and judgments must also apologize, restore the reputation of the victim, and
eliminate any impacts of the detention or misjudgment. 4 9
Compensation for violations of the right to life and health is
calculated differently. If the illegal acts of a state organ cause injury,
compensation under the SCL consists of reimbursement for medical
expenses, a daily indemnity for the loss of income from work based on the
average wage described above, and daily expenses for the victim based on
141 See supra Part II.
141 SCL, supra note 6, art. 26.
141 Id. art. 30.
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the living expenses provided by local welfare agencies for loss of work. 50 If
the abuse results in death, the family of the victim is entitled to funeral
expenses and an indemnity of up to twenty times the annual wage of state
workers and staff for the previous year.'5 ' In addition, living expenses are
paid to the dependents of victims who are unable to work themselves.' 52 In
1998, the maximum compensation allowed in the case of death was the
equivalent of 12,000 U.S. dollars.'" The uniform indemnities and
compensation limits established for wrongful detentions and harms to life
and health may be greater or less than the actual damages suffered by the
claimant. The use of these uniform standards suggests that the framers of
the SCL placed a greater emphasis on deterring official misconduct than on
compensating claimants for their actual damages.'54
Compensation for violations of property rights is more limited. If
confiscated property is in the same condition as it was when it was taken,
successful claimants are only entitled to the return of their property plus
interest.'55  No compensation is provided for loss of use. Additional
indemnities are only available if the property is lost or stolen, in which case
compensation is based on the damage to or value of the property in
question.'56 In all cases of compensation for illegal property seizures, only
direct damages to property are compensated. "
2. State Compensation Funding
Local governments provide state compensation funds. Regulations
issued by the State Council, China's top government organ,'58 require
financial organs at each level of government to budget compensation
ISO Id. art. 27. For temporary loss of work, the maximum indemnity allowed is five times the annual
wage for workers and staff set by the state. If the illegal official act causes a permanent disability, the
maximum indemnity is 10 times the annual wage if the loss of work is partial and 20 times the annual wage
if it is total. Id.
" Id. Emotional harms stemming from either an unlawful detention or from physical abuse are not
compensated unless they result in some material injury to the victim or the victim's family. See REVIEW OF
NOTABLE STATE COMPENSATION CASES, supra note 130, at 237-38. For example, if anxiety resulting from
a wrongful arrest causes a heart problem, the state organ responsible for compensation would be obliged to
pay for medical expenses related to the heart problem. Id.
152 id.
1s3 Rosenthal, supra note 53.
'5' Yong Zhang, supra note 59, at 213-14.
... SCL, supra note 6, art. 28; Xu Xun, supra note 130, at 61.
56 SCL, supra note 6, art. 28.
157 Id.
'S KENNETH LIBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA 79 (1995).
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expenses according to their "actual situation."' 59 Except in a limited number
of situations in which state organs or officials responsible for state
compensation may be required to reimburse the financial organs, all state
compensation claims are paid from these general funds. 6 ° The State
Council regulations also direct local governments at the provincial level to
promulgate detailed regulations for the handling of compensation
expenses. 6 ' This delegation of responsibility for compensation expenses
has not been without problems, as many local governments either lack the
ability or the willingness to provide compensation funds.'62  Local
regulations detailing punishments for misappropriation of compensation
funds suggest that the embezzlement of such funds may be a problem as
well.' 63 Thus, in some localities, winning a compensation claim against a
procuratorate or another government organ is of little use because there are
no funds to pay the claim.
3. The Liability of State Organs and Officials Under the SCL
Both state organs and individual officials may be liable in a state
compensation case. Under both the administrative and criminal
compensation procedures outlined in the SCL, the state organ responsible
for compensation must initially pay the claimant."6 In the case of wrongful
detentions and arrests, the organ that authorized the detention or arrest is
responsible for compensation. 61 When a guilty verdict is overturned, both
the court of first instance and the procuratorate are responsible for
"' Guojia Peichang Feiyong Guanli Banfa [Procedures on Managing State Compensation Expenses]
(issued Jan. 16, 1995) art. 6 [hereinafter SCL Expense Procedures], reprinted in 1996 ZHONGGUO FALO
NIANJIAN [1996 CHINA L. YEARBOOK] 311-12 (1996). For an English translation of the SCL Expense
Procedures, see Procedures on State Compensation Detailed, BEIJING XINHUA DOMESTIC SERVICE, Jan. 29,
1995, reprinted in FBIS-CHI 95-024, Feb. 6, 1994, at 31-33. In a circular of March 17, 1995, the Supreme
People's Procuratorate instructed procuratorial organs to implement these procedures. See Zuigao Renmin
Jianchayuan Zhuanfa Guowuyuan Guojia Peichang Feiyong Guanli Banfa de Tongzhi [Supreme People's
Procuratorate, Notice Regarding the Transmission of the State Council's "Procedures Conceming the
Administration of Expenses for State Compensation"] (issued Mar. 17, 1995), reprinted in ZHONGGUO
JIANCHA NIANJIAN 1996 [1996 CHINA PROCURATORATE YEARBOOK] 292-93 (1996).
"6 See infra notes 164-174 and accompanying text.
161 SCL Expense Procedures, supra note 159, art. 15.
162 Wang Interview, supra note 85; Sunhai Dongxi Yao Peil Guojia Peichangfa Shishi Si Nian
Huimou, Minzhu Fazhi Shuping [If You Damage Things, You Must Pay! A Look Back on Four Years of
Implementing the State Compensation Law, Commentary on Democracy and the Rule of Law], RENMIN
RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Dec. 8, 1999, at 12 [hereinafter f You Damage Things, You Must Pay!].
63 For an example of such local regulations, see Anhui Sheng Guojia Peichang Feiyong Guanli
Guiding [Anhui Province, Provisions on the Management of State Compensation Expenses] (passed June
18, 1999) art. 20 [hereinafter Anhui Provisions], reprinted in China Infobank, supra note 46.
's' SCL, supra note 6, arts. 13, 21.
6 Id. art. 19.
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compensation. 16 6 State Council regulations on compensation expenses direct
that these payments should first be made from the organ's reserves or from
funds earmarked for its own use. 167 Afterwards, the violating organizations
are directed to apply for refunds from state financial organs at the
corresponding level of government. 68 While requests for reimbursement in
administrative compensation cases may be rejected if the state organ has
committed intentional or serious mistakes, 169 there are no grounds upon
which an application may be rejected in a criminal compensation case.
Thus, procuratorates need not be concerned that compensation payments
will reduce their operating budgets.
After initially paying compensation to a victim, state organs may seek
reimbursement from the individual personnel responsible for the illegal acts.
However, the potential liability of administrative and judicial personnel
differs significantly. An administrative official who commits illegal acts
intentionally or as a result of "grave errors" can be required to reimburse his
or her administrative unit for compensation paid. 7 ° In contrast, criminal
justice officials can only be required to reimburse the state in cases of
torture, the illegal use of weapons or police gear, corruption, or fraudulent
practices undertaken out of personal considerations. 7' Thus, in most cases
of wrongful arrest, detention, or property seizure giving rise to a right to
compensation under the SCL, individual procurators cannot be required to
reimburse their units.
In limited circumstances, individual procurators responsible for
violations that fall under the SCL may face other sanctions. In cases of
torture, the illegal use of weapons, or corruption, the SCL directs the
"relevant bodies" to discipline responsible personnel and, if the violations
constitute crimes, to investigate the criminal responsibility of the
perpetrators. 72 Under the CPL, victims themselves have a right to compel
16 Id.
167 SCL Expense Procedures, supra note 159, art. 7.
168 id.
69 Id. art. 10.
' SCL, supra note 6, art. 14.
" Id. art. 24. Some local regulations provide detailed guidance on the amount of reimbursement that
must be provided by individual officials. In Chongqing, for example, individual procurators are required to
reimburse the state for between 50% and 100% of compensation expenses paid for torture, violent acts, or
corruption in the judicial process. Such reimbursements may be deducted from the monthly salary of the
procurator in question. However, the total amount reimbursed may not exceed four times the basic monthly
salary of the procurator. Chongqing Shi Shishi "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Peichangfa" Banfa
[Chongqing City Procedures for Implementing the "State Compensation Law of the People's Republic of
China"] (passed May 29, 1998) arts. 39-40 [hereinafter Chongqing Procedures], reprinted in China
Infobank, supra note 46.
7' SCL, supra note 6, art. 24.
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the prosecution of offenses that amount to crimes if a procuratorate refuses
to do so.' 73 Officials who infringe on the property rights of a victim may
also be fined or penalized under the law.'74 However, except in cases of
torture, which is a criminal offense, there is no mechanism in the law
through which a victim can enforce such sanctions. Thus, the application of
these penalties depends entirely upon the will of the relevant government
organs.
The limited liability of procuratorates and their personnel for rights
violations makes it less likely that the SCL will achieve its goal of
discouraging improper behavior on the part of procurators. If procuratorates
are able to obtain reimbursement from other government organs, there is
little institutional incentive for them to root out and prevent illegal behavior.
Furthermore, individual procurators prone to misconduct cannot be expected
to be concerned about wrongful detentions, arrests, and property seizures
because they have no potential liability in such cases. As Chinese judicial
officials who have evaluated the SCL's effectiveness have noted, one of the
major problems with the implementation of the law is that the liability of
individual state officials for rights violations is often not pursued and, as a
consequence, officials in the same state organs and departments continually
cause problems. 7 ' The judicial officials contend that the failure of state
organs to pursue reimbursement for rights violations makes the achievement
of the SCL's goal of encouraging officials to exercise power in accordance
with the law difficult. 176
4. Recommendations Related to the Allocation of State Compensation
Liability
To put some teeth into its stated goal of encouraging proper official
behavior, the SCL should permit procuratorates to seek reimbursement of
compensation expenses from procurators who intentionally, or through gross
negligence, commit an illegal act that results in the payment of criminal
compensation. Such a provision has been included in Taiwan's criminal
... REVIEW OF NOTABLE STATE COMPENSATION CASES, supra note 130, at 238; CPL, supra note 11,
arts. 170-73.
" SCL, supra note 6, art. 28(1).
'7' If You Damage Things, You Must Pay!, supra note 162. Although the official was probably
referring to situations in which individual liability under the SCL is possible but not pursued, the
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compensation law, which covers wrongful detentions and executions.'77 The
adoption of such a provision would bring the SCL's criminal compensation
provisions on individual liability into parity with similar provisions in the
administrative compensation portion of the law.'78 Holding procurators
liable for compensation expenses only when they commit intentional or
grossly negligent acts of misconduct should allay concerns that procurators
will become timid in exercising their duties for fear of incurring liability,
while at the same time providing a personal financial disincentive for
misconduct. "9
In addition, state organs responsible for compensation claims or the
head officers of such state organs should be sanctioned for rights violations
and for the failure to pursue individual responsibility for rights violations.
Sanctions could include reductions in the following year's budgetary
allotments for the state organ in question or a salary reduction or demotion
for procuratorial chiefs who are negligent in managing their departments or
who fail to punish offending procurators. Some local governments in China
have already realized the need for such measures and have given financial
organs the power to reduce the budgets of state organs that do not pursue
reimbursement of compensation expenses when such reimbursement is
appropriate. 80 Similar provisions should be included in the SCL or national
regulations to ensure that procuratorates and their head officials have an
incentive to root out abuse.
C. State Compensation Procedures
Compensation claimants must go through a complex and sometimes
lengthy set of procedures in order to receive compensation under the SCL.
The process of applying for state compensation is divided into two distinct
phases. First, the claimant must obtain legal confirmation of a violation of
his or her rights. Legal confirmation can be difficult to obtain and, as
discussed below, is one of the weakest links in the SCL. Second, the
claimant must make a formal application for compensation.
7 Criminal Compensation Law of Taiwan, supra note 66, art. 16.
z' SCL, supra note 6, art. 14.
z' See supra note 175.
so See Anhui Provisions, supra note 163, art. 20; Heilongiiang Sheng Guojia Peichang Feiyong
Guanli Guiding [Heilongjiang Province, Provisions for the Management of State Compensation Expenses]
(passed Feb. 1, 1999) art. 9, reprinted in China Infobank, supra note 46.
Vol. 9 No. I
CHINA 'S STATE COMPENSATION LA W
1. Legal Confirmation of Rights Violations
a. Legal confirmation procedures
A compensation claimant must obtain legal confirmation of a rights
violation before making an application for state compensation. 8' Little is
stated about legal confirmation in the SCL. The law simply provides that
state organs are responsible for paying criminal compensation if the
occurrence of one of an enumerated list of violations has been "legally
confirmed," and that a claimant may file a "petition" if a request for
confirmation is denied. 82 In practice, this provision has been interpreted to
mean that compensation applications cannot be accepted until there is legal
confirmation of a rights violation and, with the exception of cases involving
torture or the misuse of police weapons, evidence that the claimant has not
committed a crime."' Obtaining legal confirmation and applying for
compensation are thus separate processes. 184
Supplementary regulations issued by the Supreme People's
Procuratorate establish specific procedures for legal confirmation. A
violation is considered legally confirmed if a claimant possesses one or more
of the following documents: (1) a decision by a procuratorate to cancel or
revoke a detention warrant, arrest warrant, or case file; (2) a decision by a
procuratorate not to prosecute a case or to review and correct a case; (3) a
certificate from the police revoking a case and setting a suspect free; (4) a
legally effective judgment or ruling of a people's court declaring a
defendant innocent; (5) a decision that procuratorial officials engaged in
torture or the misuse of police weapons while exercising their powers; or (6)
an affirmation that a property seizure was illegal.'8 5 In some of these
situations, the documentation must be provided by either the procuratorate
itself or by its immediate superior. 86 Without one of these documents, the
'J SCL, supra note 6, art. 20.
182 Id.
'3 SPP Official, supra note 25.
18 id.
... Renmin Jianchayuan Xingshi Peichang Gongzuo Zanxing Guiding [Temporary Provisions of the
People's Procuratorate on Criminal Compensation Work] (passed Nov. 18, 1997) art. 6 [hereinafter
Procuratorate Compensation Regulations], reprinted in 1998 ZHONGGUO FALu NIANJIAN [1998 CHINA L.
YEARBOOK] 685-87 (1998). According to the regulations, the compensation applicant must have actual
documentary evidence of a decision not to prosecute, for example. Conceivably, a procuratorate could
decide not to prosecute a criminal case but refuse to provide the necessary documentation of such a
decision.
186 Tang Liu, Xingshi Peichang Zhong de Xieshang Chengxu [The Process of Consultation in
Criminal Compensation], FAXOE ZAZHI [LEGAL ScI.], Mar. 14, 1998, at 31.
FEBRUARY 2000
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
victim must request confirmation from the relevant procuratorate
department."' If the procuratorate refuses to confirm the violation, the
victim may apply to the procuratorate at the next level for reconsideration. 8
Beyond this, however, the victim has no further right of appeal.
For victims of procuratorial abuse, the legal confirmation process
contains a number of critical flaws.'89  First, the credibility of the
confirmation process is compromised because individuals without one of the
confirmation documents must initially apply to the organ that violated their
rights. The fact that a state organ responsible for violating a claimant's
rights reviews a compensation application creates an obvious conflict of
interest and raises serious questions of fairness and objectivity; a
procuratorate may, out of its own self-interest or in order to protect an
individual procurator, simply refuse to provide confirmation. Second,
reconsideration by an upper-level procuratorate may not be an effective
check on abuses at lower levels. Lower-level organs of judicial
administration in China often solicit the views of their superiors before
making important decisions. 9 Thus, the decision of the lower-level
procuratorate may already reflect the opinion of the procuratorate office that
will reconsider the case. Applying for this type of administrative
reconsideration is rarely an effective way for individuals to redress
grievances in the PRC.' 9'
In addition, individuals requesting legal confirmation for criminal
compensation cases have no right to appeal denials of confirmation
decisions to the compensation committee of a people's court.'92 As
discussed infra, procuratorates also review formal applications for
compensation."' In the formal compensation application phase, applicants
..7 Procuratorate Compensation Regulations, supra note 185, art. 7. Confirmation decisions must be
reported to the procuratorate committee. Id.
188 Id. art. 8.
189 See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 75-76. The Lawyers Committee
report briefly addresses the issue of legal confirmation and concludes that it is one of the primary defects in
the SCL. Chinese commentators have also criticized the legal confirmation process. See Ren Xinqian &
Zhou Yuliang, Luelun Renmin Peichang Weiyuanhui de Zuzhi Xingshi he Gongzuo Fangzhi [A Brief
Discussion of the Organizational Structure and Working Methods of the People's Court Compensation
Committees], XIANDAI FAXOE [MODERN L.], Apr. 1998, at 60-63. This is an excellent review and critique
of the people's court compensation committees written by two members of the Chongqing High Level
People's Court.
'9 Lin Feng, supra note 105, at 21.
'9' See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
92 Claimants could petition the corresponding level people's congress if their confirmation request
were denied. SPP Official, supra note 25. This right of petition is not specifically provided for in the SCL,
however. It is also of questionable effectiveness given the weak supervisory powers of the people's
congresses.
113 See infra Part IV.C.2.
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may appeal a denial to a quasi-judicial body called the people's court
compensation committee ("compensation committee").' 94  In the case of
legal confirmation, however, compensation committees do not have the
authority to accept and hear legal confirmation appeals.'95 Thus, if the
violating procuratorate or its superior does not confirm the rights violation, a
victim of procuratorial misconduct could be left without a remedy if the
victim does not possess the documentation required for automatic
confirmation. This procedural rule for criminal compensation cases
contrasts sharply with the rule applied in administrative compensation cases.
In an administrative compensation case, a claimant may appeal a denial of
legal confirmation or compensation to a people's court. 96 In fact, while
claimants in a criminal compensation case must obtain legal confirmation
before applying for compensation, in an administrative compensation case a
people's court can simultaneously address the issues of confirmation and
compensation as part of an administrative lawsuit. 197
Another problem with legal confirmation is that the procuratorate
regulations set no specific time within which a confirmation decision must
be made.198  It is thus potentially easy for a procuratorate to block a request
for legal confirmation and, since such confirmation is required for a formal
compensation application to be accepted, to block a victim's entire claim.
An obstructionist procuratorate can either deny a victim's request with
knowledge that the victim has no recourse to the people's courts or simply
delay making a decision with the knowledge that there is no legally
mandated time within which it is required to act. This is more than just a
theoretical problem. According to Chinese reports, legal confirmation is
difficult to obtain and officials commonly evade compensation by refusing
" For a description of the compensation committees and their role in the compensation application
process, see infra notes 212-226 and accompanying text.
"' Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Peichang Weiyuanhui Shenli Peichang Anjian
Chengxu de Zanxing Guiding [Temporary Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Process of
Adjudicating Compensation Cases by Compensation Committees] (issued May 6, 1996) art. 2 [hereinafter
Compensation Committee Regulations], reprinted in 1997 CHINA L. YEARBOOK, supra note 135, at 554-55.
"6 Sichuan Sheng Chengdu Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Yanjiushi [Research Office of the
Intermediate People's Court of Chengdu City, Sichuan Province], Guanyu Zhixing Guojia Peichangfa
Ruogan Wenti De Tantao [An Inquiry Regarding Several Problems in the Implementation of the State
Compensation Law], ZHENGFA LUNTAN [TRIB. POL. Sci. & L.], no. 1, 1995, at 27; Ren Xinqian & Zhou
Yuliang, supra note 189, at 62.
197 Id.
' Procuratorate Compensation Regulations, supra note 185, arts. 5-10. In contrast, procuratorates
are legally obligated to respond to formal compensation applications within designated time limits. See
infra notes 210-212 and accompanying text.
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to give legal confirmation of rights violations.'99  Thus, the legal
confirmation process is one of the weak links in the SCL.
b. Recommendations for improving the legal confirmation process
Several steps should be taken to remedy problems with the legal
confirmation process. First, the SCL and its implementing regulations
should include provisions that allow criminal compensation claimants to
appeal denials of their confirmation requests to a people's court or to a
compensation committee. Such procedures would protect compensation
claimants by giving them a clear right and a concrete procedure through
which to appeal confirmation decisions to a government body other than the
procuratorate. 200 In addition, specific time limits should be set within which
procuratorates must respond to requests for legal confirmation of a rights
violation. At least two local governments have already recognized the need
for such time limits. In their implementing regulations for the SCL, both
Chongqing City and Liaoning Province require legal confirmation requests
to be answered no later than one month after they are received. 20 1 Most
local governments have not passed such implementing regulations, however.
Time limits for confirmation should thus be included in either the SCL itself
or in implementing regulations to ensure that the SCL is applied uniformly
throughout China.
2. Applications for State Compensation
a. Application procedures
Up to three different state organs may review a criminal compensation
application. A claimant must first apply to the state organ responsible for
violating, his or her rights.20 2 In the case of procuratorates, supplementary
regulations stipulate that each procuratorate must establish a criminal
'" If You Damage Things, You Must Pay!, supra note 162. Both the director of the criminal
compensation committee office of the Guangzhou Mid-level People's Court and the vice-chairman of the
Chongqing City People's Congress Standing Committee discussed the problems with the legal confirmation
process. According to a report in the People's Daily, such problems are common throughout China. Id.
2"0 Ma Huaide acknowledges the problems with legal confirmation but argues that the right to petition
is sufficient to protect compensation claimants. MA HUAIDE, supra note 119, at 235. The procuratorial
organ at the next level of government hears such petitions, however. As argued in this Comment,
reconsideration by the procuratorate is not an adequate protection for claimants. To preserve objectivity
and fairness, petitions for confirmation should be heard by a government organ other than the procuratorate.20' Liaoning Provisions, supra note 144, art. 12; Chongqing Procedures, supra note 171, art. 10.
2"2 SCL, supra note 6, art. 20.
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compensation office to handle such compensation requests.2" 3 Upon
accepting an application, a procuratorate conducts a preliminary review of
the case. Compensation applications may be rejected at this stage for the
following reasons: (1) the violation in question occurred before the SCL was
effective, (2) the applicant does not belong to the class of individuals or
organizations that may be compensated under the law, (3) the period for
filing has expired, (4) the act in question is not within the scope of Articles
15 or 16 of the law, or (5) the applicant's materials are incomplete.2° In
addition, if the reviewing procuratorate determines that it is not the organ
responsible for compensation, the applicant is directed to apply to the proper
organ.2"5 If the application passes this initial review, a case is filed. 0 6 An
expert in the compensation office then investigates the application and
accompanying evidentiary materials in detail and makes a recommendation
on whether or not to pay compensation and, if so, the amount that should be
paid.20 7 After examination and verification by a superior in the office, the
recommendation is reported to the chief procurator.20 8 In difficult cases, the
chief procurator may consult the procuratorate committee for a decision.2 9
If compensation is approved, it must be paid within two months of the initial
application.1 0
Following initial application to the responsible government organ,
claimants have two opportunities to appeal compensation decisions. If the
responsible procuratorate does not compensate a claimant within two
months after an application is made, or if a claimant objects to the amount of
compensation, the claimant may appeal to the procuratorate at the next level
for reconsideration.2 1  If the claimant does not agree with the
reconsideration decision or a decision is not made within two months, the
claimant may make a final appeal to a compensation committee of the
people's court at the same level of government as the procuratorate that
reconsidered the case.2 12 This appeals process for criminal compensation
differs from that used in administrative compensation cases. In
administrative compensation cases, claimants must first apply to the
responsible organ but subsequently may file suit in a people's court if they
203 Procuratorate Compensation Regulations, supra note 185, art. 3.
204 Id. arts. 11-13.
205 Id. art. 13.
206 Id. art. 13(7).
207 Id. arts. 14-18.
20' Id. arts. 4, 17.
209 id.
2 0 Id. art. 18.
21 SCL, supra note 6, art. 21; Procuratorate Compensation Regulations, supra note 185, arts. 19-26.
22 SCL, supra note 6, art. 22.
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object to the initial handling of their case.2"3 During the drafting process, the
issue of whether criminal compensation claimants should have the right to
file appeals in a people's court was a contentious one.2" 4 Ultimately,
compensation committees were designated to hear criminal compensation
appeals because of a concern that in a proceeding before a people's court,judicial and procuratorial organs would become "defendants. ,2 5  This
position was seen as inconsistent with their status as adjudicative and
supervisory bodies.216  Proponents of giving claimants the right to
reconsideration instead of the right to sue in people's courts also argued that
claimants would question the fairness of a compensation hearing before a
people's court, which is part of the judicial administration apparatus and is
itself subject to supervision by the procuratorate.2 17
Compensation committees conduct what is essentially an
administrative review of the cases brought to them. The committee consists
of three to seven judges, depending on the level of the court.2 8 The director
of the compensation committee is usually a deputy chief of the court in
which the committee sits. 2 9  Although the structure of compensation
committees and the procedures for review vary, most courts have established
case-handling offices below the compensation committees that review and
make recommendations on cases.22 ° Cases are typically reviewed by a
single case manager who may or may not sit on the committee and who may
request evidence or other materials from any of the parties involved.22  The
review is not open, and the process itself is not considered litigious. 222 After
233 Id. art. 13.
214 MA HUAIDE, supra note 119, at 249.
25 PRACTICE GUIDE TO CHINA'S COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 103, at 127; MA HUAIDE, supra
note 119, at 249.
236 PRACTICE GUIDE TO CHINA'S COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 103, at 127; MA HUAIDE, supra
note 119, at 249.
2'7 MA HUAIDE, supra note 119, at 249.
23S 5CL, supra note 6, art. 23. The number of members corresponds to the level of the court.Compensation committees of intermediate-level courts are required to have from three to five committee
members, while compensation committees of high-level courts are required to have from five to seven
members. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Guanche Zhixing "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo GuojiaPeichangfa" Sheli Peichang Weiyuanhui de Tongzhi [Supreme People's Court Notice on Implementing the
State Compensation Law and Establishing Compensation Committees] (issued Dec. 23, 1994), reprinted in
DING YUECHAO ET AL., supra note 100, at 331-32.239 Ren Xinqian & Zhou Yuliang, supra note 189, at 60.
20 Id. at 60-63. In the majority of courts, compensation committees are independent bodies with
case-handling offices staffed by specialists. In some courts, however, compensation committees are notindependent of other chambers of the court, and no handling office is established. In these courts, cases are
reviewed by other chambers of the court and submitted to a compensation committee for a final decision.
Id.
22 Id. at 60-62.
222 Id.; Compensation Committee Regulations, supra note 195, arts. 10, 13.
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reviewing the case, the case handler files a report and recommendation with
the committee, which then makes a final decision on the issue of
compensation.223 In complex or difficult cases, such decisions must be
submitted to the head of the court for review and for a decision by the
court's adjudication committee.224 The adjudication committee, which
includes the court president, vice-president, and other judicial officials, is
the highest decisionmaking body of the court and has the power to decide
individual cases or order a judge to hand down a particular verdict.225
Compensation committee decisions must be made within three months of
226the filing of the case and are legally binding on the parties. After a
decision has been made, the claimant's right to reconsideration is exhausted.
While the appeals procedure provides criminal compensation
claimants with several opportunities to appeal decisions, it suffers from a
number of deficiencies. Like the confirmation appeals process, the
application process is compromised because claimants must initially apply
to the state organ that violated their rights. Although a compensation
division separate from the accused procuratorate department is designated to
handle applications, compensation is still subject to approval by the chief
procurator or procuratorate committee. Also, as illustrated in the discussion
on legal confirmation, reconsideration by an upper-level procuratorate may
not be entirely objective.
The compensation committee system also suffers from several
weaknesses. As a number of Chinese judicial officials contend, the practice
of having non-committee members review and make recommendations on
cases could lower the quality of compensation work because the committee
members rely solely on the review and recommendation of a case handler.227
In such a case, committee members must make a final decision without
having been involved in the investigation of the case and thus may lack a
detailed understanding of the facts.228 The practice of appointing the court's
deputy chief as the compensation committee director and the fact that the
compensation committee is responsible to the court are also concerns.
These factors weaken the objectivity of the committee, particularly in cases
223 Ren Xinqian & Zhou Yuliang, supra note 189, at 61.
224 Compensation Committee Regulations, supra note 195, art. 15.
225 Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The Execution of Civil
Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 7 (1996).
226 Compensation Committee Regulations, supra note 195, arts. 20-21. In difficult cases, the review
period may be extended for up to three months upon the approval of the head of the court. Id.
227 Ren Xinqian & Zhou Yuliang, supra note 189, at 62-63.
228 Id.
FEBRUARY 2000
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
in which a procuratorate or court is the state organ responsible for
compensation. "9
Finally, requiring claims to be filed with a compensation committee
instead of with a regular court may reduce the probability that a claimant
will achieve a favorable result. Unlike administrative lawsuits, reviews by
criminal compensation committees (or their case-handling offices) are
neither open nor adversarial.23 This makes it impossible for claimants to
challenge evidence provided by a state organ to a compensation committee,
and may reduce the probability that a result favorable to a claimant will be
reached at earlier stages of the compensation process. One study on
administrative litigation in the PRC suggests that the threat of public
disclosure of improper official acts may be partly responsible for a large
number of administrative cases that are settled favorably for plaintiffs
outside of court.23' Losing an administrative suit may undermine the
authority of an agency, blemish the record of officials involved, and expose
abuses of power publicly, thereby forcing higher organs to clamp down on
the agency involved.2 32 Thus, by simply filing a suit in a people's court,
plaintiffs proceeding under the Administrative Litigation Law stand a
significant chance of obtaining a favorable result.2 33 In contrast, the threat of
an open, adversarial hearing in which procuratorial misdeeds will be
publicly scrutinized and debated is not present in the SCL context. Thus,
procuratorates responsible for compensation may be less motivated to grant
compensation when they review a case and more willing to proceed to a
compensation committee hearing.
b. Recommendations related to the SCL application and adjudication
process
A number of steps should be taken to address deficiencies in the SCL
application and adjudication process. To improve the quality of case
adjudication, one or more members of the compensation committee that will
decide a case should be responsible for conducting the initial review of the
229 Id.
230 Compensation Committee Regulations, supra note 195, art. 13.
2' Minxin Pei, supra note 50, at 844. According to Pei's study, the percentage of administrative
lawsuits in which plaintiffs received favorable rulings ranged from 16% to 23% annually from 1992 to
1995. In 1994 and 1995, 16.7% and 22.5% of cases, respectively, were settled outside of court, pushing the
percentage of cases in which plaintiffs achieved a favorable result to about 40% for those years. Id.
232 Id.
233 id.
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case.234 In addition, Chinese judicial officials suggest that to safeguard the
impartiality of compensation committees and to avoid conflicts of interest,
compensation committees should be staffed by compensation specialists that
do not hold other positions and should be supervised by people's congresses
rather than by courts. 35 They also argue that it would ultimately be
desirable to have compensation cases adjudicated by a separate body
altogether, such as a special compensation court.236 Having compensation
cases adjudicated by a special court and placing such a court directly under
the supervision of the people's congresses would improve the objectivity of
the compensation process.237 It would also address concerns that the hearing
of criminal compensation cases by the people's courts could be deemed
unfair by claimants or, in cases in which a procuratorate is the responsible
state organ, would compromise the supervisory status of procuratorates.
Finally, opening compensation committee proceedings or providing
claimants with access to the courts could help to create public pressure on
government organs in the criminal compensation context, increase the
leverage of claimants in compensation cases, and thus strengthen the SCL as
a remedy against official abuse.
V. THE STATE COMPENSATION LAW IN PRACTICE, 1995-1998
Since its adoption in 1994, the SCL has only achieved marginal
success. This is evident from the small number of compensation cases.
According to official statistics, courts handled 197 criminal compensation
cases in 1995, 398 in 1996, and 531 in 1997.23 Procuratorial organs
accepted 379 compensation applications in 1996 and 669 applications in
1997 .239 Although these statistics indicate a steady increase in the number of
criminal compensation cases, recent figures on the large number of cases
mishandled by China's procurators suggest that the number should be
significantly higher. In the first eight months of 1998 alone, courts corrected
over 8110 misjudged cases and procurators reconsidered 1125 mishandled
criminal cases.240  These figures do not include cases involving
' Ren Xinqian & Zhou Yuliang, supra note 189, at 62-63.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 63.
237 Id.
23 1996 CHINA L. YEARBOOK, supra note 159, at 129; 1997 CHINA L. YEARBOOK, supra note 135, at
167; 1998 CHINA L. YEARBOOK, supra note 185, at 137.
239 1997 CHINA L. YEARBOOK, supra note 135, at 183; 1998 CHINA L. YEARBOOK, supra note 185, at
155. The number of administrative compensation cases reported to the Judicial Bureau of the State
Council totaled 150 for 1995 and 1996. Xu Xun, supra note 130, at 61.
240 Shake-up of Procuratorial System, supra note 17, and accompanying text.
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illegal property seizures or misconduct involving violence. Given what
appears to be wide-scale misconduct in China's criminal justice system, the
country's large population of 1.3 billion, and the large number of criminal
cases filed in China annually, the total number of compensation cases filed
seems very low.24'
Several reasons have been advanced for the small number of
compensation claims. According to Chinese reports, lack of public
knowledge about the SCL and its procedures is one factor that has
contributed to the low number of cases.242 Potential applicants fear that
officials will simply protect each other and do not understand that the SCL
can be used to protect the rights of citizens.243 Another factor appears to be
a feeling on the part of urban residents that the potential gain from filing a
claim is not significant. A disproportionate number of compensation cases
have been filed in economically backward areas, where the size of
compensation awards is large relative to the income of victims. 2"
Indemnities for violating the personal freedom .of individuals are calculated
on the basis of an average daily wage set by the state for staff and workers
for the previous year.245  This national average may be too low to make it
worthwhile to pursue compensation claims in larger cities, where incomes
are relatively high. As such, fewer compensation claims are filed in high-
income areas such as Beijing and Shanghai because the costs of applying for
compensation in terms of time and money are not adequately offset by
compensation awards.246
Official resistance to implementation of the SCL has also contributed
to the small number of cases filed. According to Li Xinsheng, a judge
working in the field of administrative law, some officials refuse to pay
compensation because they believe that laws are used to "crack down on
people, not to protect them" and fear that compensation will weaken
government authority.247 They also worry that compensation cases will
2! In 1997, there was only one procuratorial compensation case for every 1.9 million people in China.
A December 1998 article in the People's Daily questioned how the number of compensation cases could be
so low in a country where there are more than one million criminal and civil cases annually, the unfair
application of the law is a chronic social problem, and the Communist Party is striving to address the
problem of corruption in judicial administration. If You Damage Things, You Must Pay!, supra note 162.242 Xu Xun, supra note 130, at 61-62; If You Damage Things, You Must Pay!, supra note 162.
243 If You Damage Things, You Must Pay!, supra note 162.
244 Xu Xun, supra note 130, at 61.
243 See supra notes 148-152 and accompanying text.
24 Xu Xun, supra note 130, at 61.
247 Id. at 62. These comments are echoed by those of Deputy Procurator General Zhang Qiong, who
has stated that the main problem with implementation of the criminal compensation system is resistance
from local officials who "set compensation against crushing criminal activities." Inspecting Authorities
Shall Properly Implement Criminal Compensation Work, Interview with Mr. Zhang Qiong, Deputy Attorney
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expose their abuses and adversely affect their achievement evaluations.248
Such officials avoid paying compensation in a number of ways. Some
officials threaten compensation applicants.249 Others ignore compensation
procedures, drag out cases until the applicants give up, or simply refuse to
provide legal confirmation for rights violations. Some officials pay
compensation, but use slush funds or income from fines to pay claimants
instead of applying for reimbursement from government finance bureaus.2
This is done in order to avoid exposure212 and, presumably, detection of their
abuses by higher-level authorities. This last method of disposing of
compensation cases is particularly disturbing because it indicates that
officials are engaging in further violations of law for the purpose of paying
state compensation claims. 3  In all, such evidence of official resistance
heightens concerns about procedural weaknesses in the SCL and the
enforcement of the law. Procurators and other officials who view the SCL
as a detriment to crime-fighting efforts are more likely to take advantage of
the law's loopholes.
Lack of awareness, low potential returns, and official threats and
unresponsiveness are not the only factors that discourage criminal
compensation claims. Claimants also have a limited probability of success
even if they persevere to the final stages of the compensation process. In
1996, for example, procuratorarial organs accepted 379 compensation cases,
completed the handling of 343 cases, and awarded compensation in only 44
cases.25 4  Of 73 cases reconsidered by upper-level procuratorates in that
year, decisions were overturned in only 5 cases.255 In 1997, procuratorial
organs accepted 669 compensation cases, filed 464 cases for investigation,
and awarded compensation in 96 cases.25 6 Thus, over three-quarters of the
claimants who managed to complete the compensation procedure in 1996
and 1997 were unsuccessful. The odds of a successful result appear to be
General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, source obtained from the Beijing office of Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (on file with author).
24 Xu Xun, supra note 130, at 61; If You Damage Things, You Must Pay!, supra note 162.
24 Xu Xun, supra note 130, at 61.
250 If You Damage Things, You Must Pay!, supra note 162.
251 Id. According to Chinese reports, these problems are common throughout the country. Id.
252 id.
23 In other words, officials may use money obtained through corrupt practices, and may be
encouraged to engage in such practices, to pay compensation claims. This would be a perverse result given
the fact that the SCL was designed to prevent official misconduct.
'1 1997 CHINA L. YEARBOOK, supra note 135, at 183. The disposition of 58 cases filed for
investigation is not clear from the statistics.
25 Id. It should be noted that 20 of the 73 reconsidered cases are not accounted for in the statistics.
256 1997 CHINA L. YEARBOOK, supra note 135, at 155. According to the statistics, 98 cases are still
being handled. Id. No statistics were available for cases reconsidered in 1997.
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somewhat better in cases reviewed by compensation committees. From
1995 to the end of 1997, people's courts at the intermediate level or above
accepted 1126 criminal compensation cases and awarded compensation in
364, or 42%, of the 870 cases completed.257  Although the compensation
committee numbers are encouraging for claimants, many cases handled by
procuratorates are not appealed to a compensation committee, perhaps
because claimants fear they have little chance of success once their initial
claims have been rejected by a procuratorate 8 Overall, claimants face an
uphill battle in pursuing compensation claims against procuratorates.
Confronted with resistance by officials, the trouble of bringing a
compensation application, the relatively limited financial rewards of
pursuing a claim in urban areas, and a low probability of success, many
claimants may conclude that the SCL is not a useful mechanism through
which to redress their grievances against procurators and other government
officials.
VI. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, several more years of experience under the SCL and
more comprehensive statistics on criminal compensation are needed in order
to definitively assess whether the SCL is an effective remedy for
procuratorial misconduct. However, based on information currently
available, it is clear that changes to. the SCL and its implementing
regulations are needed if its goals are to be realized. Specifically, the scope
of the SCL and exceptions to the law should be defined more precisely,
procedural rights for criminal suspects should be more adequately protected,
and individual procurators should be required to reimburse the state for
compensation expenses in cases of intentional or grossly negligent
misconduct. Moreover, to safeguard the impartiality of the review process
and to solve the problem of legal confirmation, the SCL should give
applicants the right to an open, adversarial hearing before a people's court or
257 See 1996 CHINA L. YEARBOOK, supra note 159, at 129; 1997 CHINA L. YEARBOOK, supra note
135, at 167; 1998 CHINA L. YEARBOOK, supra note 185, at 137. Unfortunately, separate statistics for cases
involving the procuratorate are not available. The statistics break down as follows: 1997, 531 cases
accepted, compensation awarded in 226, or 53% of the 425 cases completed; 1996, 398 cases accepted,
compensation awarded in 74, or 25% of the 291 cases completed; 1995, 197 cases accepted, compensation
awarded in 64, or 42% of the 154 cases completed.
258 This is evident from a comparison of the total number of cases reviewed by compensation
committees (which include all compensation cases involving investigative, procuratorial, judicial, and
prison management organs) and the number of cases handled by the procuratorate.
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a compensation committee on the issues of compensation and legal
confirmation.
While the number of compensation cases has increased steadily, the
low number of cases relative to China's population and the number of
misconduct cases involving criminal justice officials suggest that many
victims of procuratorial misconduct are not using the SCL. Educating both
citizens and officials about the SCL and enforcing the law will help to raise
the number of cases and alleviate the threat of official retaliation against
claimants. Perhaps equally important, the potential gains from pursuing
compensation must be worth the risks and costs. In this respect, the daily
indemnity for violations of personal freedom should be adjusted to reflect
regional variations in income. Amending the SCL to provide loss of use
damages for illegally confiscated property might also make pursuing a state
compensation claim more worthwhile. Official resistance to implementation
of the SCL must also be dealt with. Such recalcitrance increases the risk
that procedural weaknesses in the law will be manipulated and heightens the
need for these flaws to be addressed rapidly. Addressing procedural
weaknesses in the law may in turn encourage claimants to pursue valid
claims. With fewer procedural obstacles in the way, claimants will have an
improved chance of success and may begin to view the SCL as a legitimate
mechanism through which to respond to procuratorial misconduct.
Promulgating local implementing regulations may be one way to deal
with these problems. Some local governments have passed SCL
implementing regulations that address substantive and procedural problems
in the law, a development that has attracted the attention of the NPC and
China's Supreme People's Court.25 9 While the passage of such local
regulations is a positive development, reliance on local regulations may lead
to disparate application of the SCL and leave some victims of misconduct
unprotected; local governments may enact different regulations or may
choose not to enact such regulations at all. Consequently, amending the
SCL or national implementing regulations for the SCL would be a more
effective long-term solution for dealing with problems that have arisen in
the implementation of the law.
The need to improve the SCL and its implementation should not
detract from the great significance of this piece of legislation, however.
While this Comment has criticized certain aspects of the law, from a broad
perspective the SCL represents an important achievement in China's legal
reform effort. The SCL is a significant symbolic step because its very
259 If You Damage Things, You Must Pay!, supra note 162.
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enactment is recognition by the state that procurators and other officials
make mistakes and that China's citizens should be compensated for such
misconduct. It is also substantively important because individuals now have
a concrete, officially recognized mechanism through which to challenge
procuratorial misconduct and, if necessary, to compel an external review of
procuratorial acts. Thus, while the law contains deficiencies and the number
of compensation cases is not large at present, the SCL provides one of the
few remedies through which citizens can protect themselves and take action
against procuratorial abuse. In this sense, the SCL is an important step in
the right direction.
